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Abstract 
 
 
Stinchfield, Andrew Automobiles, Autarky, and Authority: The Effects of Nazi 
Centralized Economic Planning, 1932-1945 
 
 
This thesis examines the benefits and drawbacks of Nazi centralized economic planning. 
From an entirely political and economical standpoint, Hitler and the National Socialists’ highly 
regulated and restrictive policies were initially beneficial for Germany because they created a 
centralized economic vision and improved national morale. The liberal ideology of the Weimar 
Republic resulted in major class divisions within the nation, where laissez-faire economics left 
middle-citizens marginalized and at the mercy of profit-seeking big businesses. The Wall Street 
Crash of 1929 exposed the weaknesses of liberalism and resulted in a massive rise in political 
resentment. The regime accumulated power because their economic plan was anti-capitalist and 
aimed at benefiting the entire German collective. The party continuously promoted the idea of 
Volksgemeinschaft, which was a plan to create a strong and unified German community. Many 
German industrial businesses opposed the regime’s rise to power because their policies limited 
business freedom. Volkswagen, Bosch GmbH, and IG Farben are three companies that 
exemplify the pros and cons of Nazi centralization and the effect their policies had on the 
national economy.  
The party attacked the nation’s economic crisis by creating and subsidizing projects in 
the nation’s automotive sector because Hitler believed a nation’s standard of living could be 
measured by how many citizens owned a motorcar. Thus they created huge public works 
projects, such as the Autobahn and Volkswagen, to alleviate the labor crisis and improve the 
nation’s transportation sector. Volkswagen was a massive project entirely sponsored by the state 
that aimed to make the motorcar a basic good owned by all German citizens. It was a piece of 
 ii 
Hitler’s Volksprodukt campaign that was supposed to help Germany become a richer consumer 
society. The nation’s automotive sector was also improved by the regime when they offered tax 
deductions for companies willing to participate in motorization projects. The incentive motivated 
private businesses to become involved in the nation’s vision and led many companies to greatly 
prosper, such as Bosch GmbH. 
 As Germany’s automotive sector developed, the regime began promoting policies that 
would strengthen the nation on a macroeconomic level. In 1936 the NSDAP announced the Four 
Year Plan, a policy that hoped to make the nation entirely independent and self-sufficient in four 
years’ time. The party supported private businesses that bought into this vision, which prompted 
many companies to form close relations with the party. IG Farben, for instance, greatly benefited 
under Nazi rule because it rearranged its business to concentrate on the research and 
development of synthetic alternatives. Nazi centralized economic planning had Germany on 
course to not only become one of the most powerful nations in Europe, but the world.  
The Third Reich’s system eventually deservedly failed because it denied basic freedoms 
to private businesses and citizens and committed atrocious acts to races deemed inferior. Political 
centralization allowed the regime to accumulate too much power, leading to demands that the 
entire nation share their vision. Private businesses lost independence and were coerced to 
participate in national projects. In addition, Nazi law infringed on citizens’ civil liberties since 
the party had the power to imprison, fine, or kill anyone that opposed their ideology. Nazi 
centralization ultimately failed when they began using their power and authority to exterminate 
Jews and other innocent races. Volkswagen, IG Farben, and Bosch GmbH are three companies 
that help demonstrate the benefits and drawbacks of Nazi centralized economic planning and the 
effect it had on industrial Germany.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists’ centralized economic planning were both 
beneficial and destructive for German business and society. The regime’s policies had a 
profound effect on the nation’s economy, as they helped stimulate activity following the 
formidable Great Depression. Their centralized economic plan restored national morale and 
motivated businesses to produce and expand by ensuring financial support for their projects. The 
party’s rule also helped Germany’s economy achieve profits and earnings that were 
unprecedented for the nation. However, Nazi political centralization rightfully failed because of 
the their monstrous moral beliefs and restrictions imposed on civil freedoms.  
 Prior to Hitler’s rule, Germany flourished under the liberal jurisdiction of the Weimar 
Republic. During this time the government took the laissez-faire approach, where they believed 
unrestrictive capitalism policies would translate to immense profits and growths. The 
decentralized political system spread responsibilities and power from the federal government to 
local bureaucracies and private businesses, which allowed actors to freely operate in their best 
interest. The system caused a number of firms to prosper immensely and solidify an important 
role in the world market. Because authority and decision-making were taken from the national 
level and given to citizens and private enterprises, German society saw a remarkable cultural 
renaissance. In the 1920s German literature, cinema, theater, and music all entered a phase of 
great ingenuity. Each sector grew and blossomed because the Weimar Republic promoted free 
and open thinking. New schools were frequently established to engage students in new methods 
of learning. Theaters, concert halls, and art galleries opened throughout Berlin. And Albert 
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Einstein rose to public prominence and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1921.1 
Decentralized governments promoted open-mindedness and free action, which led to business 
growth and cultural enlightenment. The Weimar’s policies encouraged citizens to act freely and 
express themselves culturally. Their administration also gave German businesses the power to 
act in their best interest, which is why many of them became heavily integrated in the world 
market.  
 However, liberalism and self-determination also caused the Weimar Republic to fail 
because their policies created major divisions throughout German society. The system led 
businesses and citizens to act greedily and in manners that served their own self-interest, which 
in turn created a national identity crisis. The public lost a great deal of faith in their nation 
following World War I when a large number of soldiers and innocent civilians died. Majority of 
the nation developed a sense of despair because they believed Germany was no match compared 
to some of the other world powers. When the Weimar Republic came to power, they offered 
Germany no unified and cohesive vision. Instead businesses were given the freedom to act how 
they wanted. Citizens were encouraged to find new and different ways to express themselves. 
And the government took a backseat and let the nation control itself, leading to massive class 
divisions. The system ultimately failed when United States’ banks crashed and Germany was 
launched into an economic depression.  
 The Weimar Republic stimulated the nation’s recovery from World War I by accepting 
loans from American banks and redistributing them to German banks and businesses. This 
allowed capital to circulate through the economy and encouraged businesses the opportunity to 
freely engage in financial transactions. But the government accepted loans at too high of a rate, 
                                                
1“The Nobel Prize in Physics 1921: Albert Einstein,” NobelPrize.org, accessed March 1, 2013, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1921/.  
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causing their economy to collapse when American banks crashed. By 1931, over 6 billion 
Reichsmarks were withdrawn from German businesses and a crippling shock wave was sent 
through the nation. Businesses declared bankruptcy and millions of citizens became unemployed. 
More importantly, the Depression changed the public’s opinion of a liberal economics and 
political decentralization. Many citizens attributed the collapse of Germany’s economy to the 
Weimar Republic and free enterprise because they believed unrestricted capitalism left the public 
susceptible to dangers outside their control. Businesses and bureaucratic institutions were free to 
operate in ways that benefited only themselves rather than the entire nation. Thus political 
perception changed and many started to support the idea of strong state management. Centralized 
economic planning would ensure that the nation had a cohesive unified vision. The system would 
create a strict economic agenda that all German actors followed and contributed to, rather than 
the liberal Weimar system that resulted in divisions.  
 Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime advocated a form of socialism where their political 
strategy was focused primarily on anti-business and anti-capitalist rhetoric. The party’s main 
argument was that capitalism destroyed nations because it favored international finance and 
made big businesses economically dominant. The liberal Weimar Republic allowed private 
businesses to freely trade abroad with foreign countries, resulting in many to profit immensely. 
However, the policies caused Germany to become overly reliant on the world market and they 
required foreign commerce to fulfill the nation’s domestic needs. Hitler vehemently the idea that 
private enterprise can steer national economies because he believed it created conflictions visions 
and inequalities. Therefore the Nazi party created policies that were less concerned with 
international relations and instead focused more on ways that strengthened the entire nation, such 
as becoming independent in the production of raw materials. These policies would restrict the 
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profit-seeking impulses of private businesses and force them to act in manners that benefited the 
German collective. The Nazi government’s promise to strengthen the entire nation is a major 
reason for their rise to power. Millions had become unemployed following the Depression and 
many believed it was due to the selfish actions of big businesses. Thus the German public 
eagerly supported the regime because they would create a more unified and equal “national 
community,” or Volksgemeinschaft. The NSDAP believed that with strong centralized power 
they could eventually erase class and political divisions and increase the standard of living of the 
Germany. Majority of citizens were ready for this type political system in 1932 because it would 
provide them with a stronger sense of purpose. Thus in 1933, Adolf Hitler was elected chancellor 
and the Weimar Republic transformed into the Third Reich.  
 To a point, Germany benefited from Nazi centralization because their policies helped 
stimulate economic growth, restore business confidence, and improve national morale. First and 
foremost, the party created a strict agenda in which the entire nation was both encouraged and 
forced to follow. The regime knew economic activity needed to be stimulated in some form or 
another, therefore they took it upon themselves to create huge public works projects that would 
help resolve the unemployment crisis and encourage business to invest. For instance, the regime 
initiated a road-building program that would pave thousands of miles of roads and create a huge 
need for labor. To encourage businesses to contribute in the nation’s economic recovery, tax 
deductions were offered to any firm that worked in the automotive sector. Eventually, 
unemployment was resolved and the nation’s economy was on track to surpass pre-World War I 
levels.  
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Morale was destroyed following the Great Depression and businesses were unwilling to 
invest during such unstable times. Nazi centralization resolved alleviated this hesitancy by 
supporting private enterprise’s investments. Firms were willing to begin new projects or resume 
production were supported financially by the party. Over time, the regime’s policies helped the 
nation rebuild and they soon were on track to become one of the most prosperous and dominant 
countries in the entire world.  
 However, Nazi economics eventually failed because the restrictions they imposed basic 
civil liberties and their atrocious acts against races they deemed inferior. Private enterprises lost 
independency under Nazi rule and they no longer had the power of decision-making. They were 
forced to follow the Nazis’ agenda and engage in the production of materials that the regime 
believed were important to the national collective. In addition, basic civil liberties like freedom 
of expression were non-existent under Hitler’s jurisdiction. The government had the authority to 
imprison, fine, or kill citizens that opposed the party’s ideology. The Third Reich aimed to 
achieve Volksgemeinschaft by purifying their nation of races that were inferior. They used their 
authority and power to issue decrees that harmed Jewish civilians and eventually attempted to 
annihilate the Jewish race altogether.  
 Nazi centralized economic planning had positive effects on Germany society, but 
ultimately failed because the party accumulated too much power and their beliefs were too 
radical. Volkswagen, IG Farben, and Bosch GmbH are three companies worth examining 
because they each had similar and unique experiences under Hitler’s rule. Volkswagen was a 
completely state owned entity that was both conceived and funded by the regime. IG Farben, on 
the other hand, was a huge independent chemical conglomerate that saw they could profit form 
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creating relations with the party. And lastly, Bosch GmbH represents was an electrical 
engineering firm that renounced relations with the regime and supported a resistance campaign.   
 The three companies are important because their experiences shows how Nazi centralized 
planning had a varying effect on German industry. Each business greatly profited from the 
party’s economic policies and experienced huge surges in employment. Each company also had a 
specific role in the national agenda. Volkswagen would help the nation achieve 
Volksgemeinschaft by making the motorcar a standardized good owned by all citizens. IG Farben 
would cause Germany to become self-sufficient and independent from the world market in the 
production of raw materials. And Bosch GmbH would contribute towards the motorization 
campaign and the Four Year Plan.  
 Volkswagen, IG Farben, and Bosch GmbH all demonstrate how Nazi centralized 
planning was beneficial and destructive for the nation’s economy. Each company experienced 
immense profits under the regime’s rule, where they all opened new factories, developed 
innovative products, and grew in size and profits. But their experiences also display the negative 
effects of those policies and how they hindered decision-making and autonomy. All three 
businesses were forced to follow the government’s agenda and fire Jewish workers, used forced 
laborers, and fuel the war effort. Each company helps show the experiences of industrial 
Germany and the transition from the liberal Weimar Republic to the strict totalitarianism of the 
Nazi regime.  
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Chapter 1: The Failures of the Weimar Years 
 
 
 On the eve of World War I, Germany possessed all the features of an advanced and 
expanding industrial economy. The country was structured around economic liberalism and free 
trade, where they relied heavily on foreign capital and world commerce. They were an industrial 
powerhouse and ranked first in iron, steel, and synthetic dye production. By 1900 their chemical 
industry dominated the world market for synthetic dyes, as BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, and other 
major German firms controlled close to 90% of the world dye production and sold 80% of their 
products abroad.2 The nation was structured on the ideology of free enterprise and laissez-faire. 
The government provided little interference with economic activity and instead allowed 
unrestricted capitalism and commerce fuel national growth. The economic freedoms the German 
government granted private corporations caused many industrial firms to become heavily 
involved in the world market where they traded iron, steel, electrical equipment, textiles, and 
other industrial goods with foreign countries in exchange for essential raw materials and capital. 
“Before World War I Germany was one of the greatest creditor nations. Her foreign holdings in 
1905 were variously estimated at 25 to 40 millard Marks.”3 A creditor nation is a country whose 
investments abroad exceed in value the investments made in it by foreign countries. In essence, 
Germany had invested more resources in other countries than the rest of the world had invested 
in them. The nation’s relationship with the world market was created through the liberal policies 
of the government where instead of regulating economic activity, they allowed firms to freely 
pursue trade opportunities. The system caused Germany to become heavily reliant on 
                                                
2 Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge (Cambridgeshire:  
Cambridge UP, 1987), 7. 
3 Nehemiah Robinson, "German Foreign Trade and Industry After the First World War,” (The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 58.4, 1994), 625.  
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connections with foreign countries because they required world trade to satisfy their domestic 
needs. The nation’s liberal and decentralized political system created a very weak economic 
structure and left the nation vulnerable to sudden changes in the world market.  
 With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Germany found itself at a tremendous 
disadvantage. Because Germany depended on foreign trade for raw materials, Great Britain and 
other Allied Powers were able to use naval blockades as an effective military tactic to interfere 
with Germany trade routes.4 As previously mentioned, Germany was an industrial powerhouse 
that produced more coal, steel, and synthetic chemicals than any other country in the world. 
Their economy relied on the trade and export of these industrial goods in return for important 
raw materials and capital. The United Kingdom and British Royal Navy destroyed Germany by 
using naval blockades as an economic weapon. The blockades interfered the nation’s trade and 
caused the public to starve from a lack of essential domestic resources. Britain’s navy declared 
the North Sea a war zone destroyed all commercial ships headed towards Germany, causing their 
economy to suffer.5 Before the war, German exports supplied 22% of the national product; in 
1928 the figure was only 16%.6 Their share in world exports dropped from 13.1% in 1913 to 
7.1% in 1925.7 These decrease in percentages are astronomical for a country that required 
international trade as a means of functioning. The nation’s liberal economic model caused 
businesses to form relations with overseas markets because it was most profitable for them. 
Unfortunately, it made the nation dependent on those connections where they required industrial 
                                                
4 Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-
Hungary, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1940), 12. 
5 Spencer Tucker and Mary Roberts, World War I, (ABC-CLIO, 2005), 836.  
6 Richard James Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938, (England: New York, 1996), 
44. 
7 Robinson, German Foreign Trade and Industry after the First World War, 620.  
 9 
to satisfy their domestic needs. Britain rendered Germany’s industrial products useless because 
they could no longer be exchanged for important raw materials.  
 Germany’s liberal economic model caused the nation to form an unhealthy reliance on 
the world market. “Germany needed raw materials and food from overseas export markets to 
provide its population with work and bread.”8 The public slowly began to starve from Britain’s 
block of trade routes and it resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.  
 The German Board of Public Health in December 1918 claimed that 763,000 German 
civilians died from starvation and disease caused by the blockade up until the end of 
December 1918.9 
 
The naval blockade were a major reason for the Allied Powers victory in World War I as it 
interfered with how the German economy operated. The irreparable damages that it created 
would later force Germany to re-evaluate their economic structure. The government’s inability to 
provide essential domestic resources for the public caused many citizens to believe that 
liberalism and capitalism were wrong for the nation. The liberal system made the lower-middle 
class feel marginalized and at the mercy of profit-seeking businesses. The events of World War I 
allowed extremist parties such as the NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker’s Party) to 
gain popularity because they advocated for the country’s economy to shift away from liberalism 
and free commerce and instead become stronger and more conscious of the welfare of the entire 
nation.  
Germany re-entered the world market after World War I at a tremendous disadvantage. 
The Treaty of Versailles was a document issued by the Allied Powers that imposed major 
punishments and restriction on Germany. The document restricted Germany’s military such as 
                                                
8 Adam J. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, 
(New York: Viking, 2007), 54.  
9 “The Blockade of Germany,” The National Archives, accessed January 14, 2013, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/blockade.htm.  
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prohibiting the exports and imports of weapons and limiting the German armed forces to less 
than 100,000 troops.10 But more importantly, it assigned Germany as fully responsible for 
causing the war. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles reads:  
The Allied and Associated Government affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of 
Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and 
Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the 
war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.11  
 
With Germany and her allies deemed responsible for causing the outbreak of World War I, they 
became responsible for paying all of the damages experienced by the Allied Powers. The treaty 
demanded that Germany pay the total sum of 269 billion marks in war reparations.12 The 269 
billion gold marks, which is the equivalent of almost 100,000 tons of pure gold, were not within 
the means of Germany to pay. The 100,000 tons of gold is equivalent to more than 50% of all the 
gold ever mined in history.13  
 Germany’s share in world exports, which got as low as 7.1% in 1925, slowly started to 
recover, as did world trade. In 1926 the figure had grown to 8.4% and in 1929 to 9.9%.14Their 
economy was rebuilding and looking to reclaim their position as one of the major industrial 
exporters in the world market. However, the reparations called for by the Treaty of Versailles 
were disrupting their recovery. Thus in 1924 a committee formed to establish the Dawes Plan 
and a workable system was created that would help Germany could pay war debts without 
                                                
10 “Treaty of Versailles, 1919,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, last modified May 
11, 2012, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005425.  
11 Michael Duffy, “Primary Documents - Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919," First World War, 
last modified August 22, 2009, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles231-247.htm. 
12 Olivia Lang, "Why Has Germany Taken so Long to Pay off Its WWI Debt?,” BBC News, last 
modified February 10, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11442892. 
13 Lang, Why Has Germany Taken so Long to Pay off Its WWI Debt?, 1. 
14 Robinson, German Foreign Trade and Industry after the First World War, 620.  
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jeopardizing its financial stability.15 Yet, the plan did not offer enough financial aid and it was 
still too difficult for Germany to recover, therefore they modified the plan in 1929 and renamed 
it the Young Plan. The new plan softened the burdens by reducing payments from 269 billion 
gold marks to 112 billion gold marks that would be paid over a 59-year period.16  
 To help Germany to retain their position in the world market, the Weimar Republic began 
borrowing large sums of money from overseas countries, the bulk of it from the United States, 
and reinvesting the capital into the economy to rejuvenate struggling businesses. Foreign nations 
gladly loaned money to Germany because they were attracted to the nation’s unique economy 
and huge returns they experienced from their investments. Germany was willing to pay high 
interest rates to investors who loaned capital and organizations such as J. P. Morgan, for 
example, issued loans totaling $100 million to Germany to help them pay reparations and 
stimulate economic activity.17 As Germany accepted more and more foreign capital, they began 
to travel down an eerily similar slope. “The reliance on foreign credit tied Germany into a 
dangerous dependency on the world’s financial markets at a time when there existed serious 
structural weakness in the world monetary and payment systems.”18 After World War I, 
countries lacked economic stability and their financial structures were weak. As a result, private 
businesses became unwilling to spend money, which resulted in hyperinflation. In order to help 
circulate capital throughout Germany’s economy, the Weimar Republic ordered for more 
currency to be printed. But German businesses were not hiring nor being productive and the 
nation’s currency became meaningless. In 1919 one loaf of bread cost 1 mark; by 1923 the same 
                                                
15 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 6. 
16 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 6. 
17 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 6. 
18 Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery. 11. 
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loaf of bread cost 100 million marks.19 The Weimar Republic hoped printing currency and 
accepting loans would help rebuild the nation’s economic structure. But instead it had a negative 
effect and launched the nation into greater debt.  
Germany was accepting loans on both a long-term and short-term basis. The loans were 
re-invested into the economy as a way to support industrial and commercial reconstruction.20 
However this method was an extremely dangerous approach for rebuilding an economy because 
a number of countries lacked economic stability following the war. “But, [money loaned from 
foreign countries] tended to be re-loaned within Germany on a long-term basis, making it 
difficult to repay short-term lending should it be suddenly recalled.”21 Accepting capital from 
foreign countries and redistributing them on a long-term basis made it very difficult to locate 
these loans should they suddenly be recalled.  
Table I. Borrowing from abroad: Germany’s foreign debt position, spring 1931 (million RM) 
 Long-term Short-term Total 
United States 5,265 3,143 8,408 
Britain 1,100 2,053 3,153 
Netherlands 1,174 2,069 3,243 
Switzerland 512 1,878 2,390 
Other 1,494 2,826 4,320 
Total 9,545 11,696 21,514 
Source: Adam J. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, (New York: 
Viking, 2007), 7. 
 
Table I indicates the amount of money that was loaned to Germany from the end of World War I 
to 1931. Germany was accepting short-term loans from the United States, Great Britain, the 
                                                
19 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 6. 
20 Owen, Smith E, The German Economy, (London: Routledge, 1994), 5.  
21 Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 11. 
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Netherlands and other European nations and investing them on a long-term basis to rejuvenate 
German commerce and pay reparations. But, they were accepting money abroad on an alarming 
rate. 
Between October 1925 and the end of 1928 the inflow of foreign capital was so large that 
Germany could make its reparation payments without even having to earn a surplus on its 
trade account. This was convenient for the British and French since it enabled them to 
insist on German payments without having to open their markets to billions of 
Goldmarks’ worth of goods. At the same time it allowed Washington to insist that France 
and Britain honor the debts they owed America as a result of the war.22 
 
A very weak and unstable circle was created in which Germany borrowed money from the 
United States to pay reparations to Britain and France, who then used that money to satisfy their 
debts to America. The Weimar Republic believed it was helping economic recovery by accepting 
foreign capital and investing it into banks and businesses. And the United States was earning a 
substantial return on their investment. But as loans continued to pour in from foreign countries 
the German economy became more and more fragile.  
Similar to before World War I, Germany was once again exposing themselves to dangers 
outside their control by becoming heavily dependent on the fragile world market. Prior to WWI, 
they relied on trade with overseas markets as a source for raw materials. Following the war, they 
again became dependent on global connections by tying themselves to foreign credit. Germany 
was once an industrial powerhouse that dominated the production of steel, coal, and synthetic 
chemicals. They were one of the biggest creditor nations in the world where they had a positive 
net investment. Now, they were losing that status and becoming a debtor nation, which meant 
that they had an unfavorable balance of trade, e.g. an excess of imports over exports or a net 
inflow of capital from foreign investors. This reliance on foreign credit tied Germany into a 
                                                
22 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 6. 
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dangerous dependency on the world’s financial markets at a time where there existed serious 
structural weaknesses.23  
On October 24, 1929, the United States stock market crashed, sending a severe shock 
wave through Germany. The German economy, which was supported by the granting of loans 
through the Dawes Plan and the Young plan, suffered enormously when foreign investors 
withdrew their loans. The United States withdrew all the loans they issued to Germany, which 
meant that the Weimar Republic needed to track down all the capital that had been re-loaned to 
German businesses.  
 What might have been a ‘normal’ business-cycle downswing turned into an economic 
catastrophe because of the recall of short-term loans and the drying up of long-term 
lending.24 
 
As foreign investors demanded payments for their loans, banks began to search and call in loans 
that had been lent to firms. “By the end of 1931 over 6.5 billion marks have been withdrawn 
from Germany or sent out by German investors seeking greater security.”25 Most of the capital 
supporting Germany’s economy was withdrawn and there was no longer any structural support 
for banks and businesses.  
The Wall Street Crash left Germany badly exposed and caused both commerce and 
employment to suffer tremendously.  
The exceptionally high levels of unemployment in 1930-3 were produced by the near 
collapse of the German credit system in 1931 and the decline of foreign trade. The 
withdrawal of loans created a major liquidity crisis, while the value of German exports 
fell by almost two thirds between 1929 and 1932.26  
 
                                                
23 Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 7. 
24 Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 14.  
25 Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 14. 
26 Richard James Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 41.  
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Since many German banks and industrial enterprises had used short-term credit from foreign 
countries to finance long-term investment programs, the withdrawal of loans quickly caused a 
cash-flow crisis.27 The withdrawal of capital caused he backbone of the nation’s economy to be 
ripped out. Businesses suffered, citizens were laid off, and unemployment engulfed the country. 
Germany’s middle-class suffered the most as most became unemployed.  
Table II. Registered unemployed, 1929-1932 (‘000)a 
 1929 1930 1931 1932 
January 2,850.2 3,217.6 4,886.9 6,041.9 
February 3,069.7 3,365.8 4,971.8 6,128.4 
March 2,483.9 3,040.7 4,743.9 6,034.1 
April 1,711.6 2,786.9 4,358.1 5,739.0 
May 1,349.8 2,634.7 4,052.9 5,582.6 
June 1,260.0 2,640.6 3,953.9 5,475.7 
July 1,251.4 2,765.2 3,989.6 5,392.2 
August 1,271.9 2,882.5 4,214.7 5,223.8 
September 1,323.6 3,004.2 4,354.9 5,102.7 
October 1,557.1 3,252.0 4,623.4 5,109.1 
November 2,035.6 3,698.9 5,059.7 5,355.4 
December 2,850.8 4,383.8 5,668.1 5,772.9 
Average 1,898.6 3,075.5 4,519.7 5,575.4 
Source: Richard James Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 39. 
As Table II demonstrates, unemployment skyrocketed following the Wall Street Crash where the 
number of registered unemployed rose from 2 million in 1929 to over 6 million in 1932. 
Economic liberalism and free trade failed Germany because it left majority of the nation at the 
mercy profit-seeking businesses.  
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 The unemployment crisis launched Germany and the Weimar Republic into economic 
distress. The government was unable to do anything that helped the issue, though what it did do 
made the situation worse. Taxes were raised, incomes reduced, and government spending was 
cut back. Eventually two out of every five Germans employed in 1929 were without work in the 
winter of 1932-3, and the nation’s situation showed no signs of improvement.28As seen in table 
III, trade suffered infinitely as by 1933 exports were only 39 per cent of the level they were in 
1928.  
Table III. German Trade Statistics 1928-38 
 1928 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Exports (bn RM) 12.3 5.7 4.9 4.2 4.3 
Imports (bn RM) 14.0 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.2 
Balance of trade -1.7 1.0 0.7 -0.3 1.0 
Source: Richard James Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938, (England: New York, 1996), 45.  
The Weimar Republic’s liberal policies promoted free trade and gave businesses the freedom to 
form connections with foreign countries. Many private enterprises grew and expanded from this 
system and solidified dominant roles in the world market. But unregulated capitalism failed 
because it caused the middle-class to become marginalized, such as what happened with the 
Great Depression. “The recession exposed the weakness of the liberal market economy and 
turned German economists and politicians to the idea of state management of the economy and 
relative isolation from the world market.”29 The Wall Street crash brought attention to major 
deficiencies of Germany’s liberal politics and many citizens started to support more radical 
alternatives like the Communist and National Socialist parties.  
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 The Wall Street Crash and Depression were the last straw for majority of Germany. 
Political decentralization and liberal economics created a nation that was disconnected and 
unequal. Private businesses acted in manners that hindered the public and as a result major class 
divisions emerged. Hitler and the Nazi regime rose to power because they offered the German 
nation an entirely new direction. They promised the public that strong state management and 
restrictive policies would resolve the economic crisis and create a unified national agenda. 
Capitalism and unrestricted trade would no longer control the nation. Instead Hitler guaranteed 
that if elected a more equal, unified, and stronger Germany would emerge.  
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Chapter 2: The Rise of Hitler and the Nazi Regime 
 
 
Adolf Hitler exploited the Weimar Republic’s weaknesses and used their failures to his 
advantage. World War I and the Depression brought the inefficiencies of laissez-faire economics 
to attention and caused the German public to desire a political system that was new and different. 
In 1932 the nation was a mess and 6 million citizens were unemployed. Hitler promoted the 
party’s values and ideology at this time, pledging that his party could bring the nation back from 
its current misery. The National Socialists party believed that a powerful centralized government 
would be beneficial because it would help create a unified economic agenda. The nation would 
follow a unified plan that benefited the entire German collective, rather than individual private 
businesses. The party highlighted how unrestricted capitalism caused the lower middle-class to 
suffer and become impoverished. The nation should therefore support the National Socialists 
because it would systematically change the way Germany operated and bring about national 
renewal. In 1932 Hitler promised Germany change; and he in fact delivered a revolution.  “The 
Nazis saw their Machtergreifung (seizure of power) as more than simply a change of 
government: it represented the start of a revolution which would transform German society in 
accordance with their ideology.”30The regime wanted to completely revolutionize the working 
class and restore faith in the nation’s economic and political system. They accomplished this by 
creating new policies that appealed to the lower-middle class. Thus the German youth, middle-
class workers, and farmers all began to pledge their support to the National Socialists because 
their program aimed to destroy class barriers and raise the standard of living of the German 
collective.  
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The fundamental problem was Germany was not an affluent society. Following the 
Depression, millions of Germans were unemployed and there was little capital circulating 
through the nation’s economy. In result Germany fell far behind other nations technologically, 
such as the United States.  
By the 1920s the standard accoutrements of twentieth-century mass consumption—the 
car, the refrigerator, the radio—were already establishing themselves as the norm in the 
United States, at a time when the enjoyment of these same commodities was limited to a 
restricted circle of the European upper middle class.31  
 
The nation experienced serious setbacks from the First World War and the great depression. 
Majority of the public lacked basic goods that average American citizens enjoyed. Part of the 
Nazis’ agenda was to revolutionize the lower-middle class, which had been oppressed from the 
liberal and capitalist policies of the Weimar Republic, and create a Volksgemeinschaft, or 
“people’s community.” Volksgemeinschaft was a Nazi socialist program that aimed to restore 
national unity and equality and raise the standard of living of Germany.  
When asked by a journalist to describe his ultimate political objectives, Hitler said, “I 
have the ambition to make the German people rich and Germany beautiful. I want to see the 
living standard of the individual raised.”32 Hitler believed the German people deserved a political 
system better than the Weimar Republic. The nation should have a government that aimed to 
raise the nation to a higher level of life, more appropriate to the vision Volksgemeinschaft, which 
was a community of superior racial worth.33 The NSDAP made it their mission to use their 
political authority to make Germany a more affluent society. They would accomplish this by 
collaborating with German industries to create a standardized and simplified version of key 
consumer commodities. These products would then be produced at the lowest possible price, 
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allowing the German population to achieve an immediate advancement to a higher standard of 
living.  
The epithet, which was generally attached to these products, was Volk: the 
Volksempfaenger (radio), Volkswohnung (apartments), Volkswagen (automobile), 
Volkskuehlschrank (refrigerator), and Volkstraktor (tractor).34 
 
The Nazi government used their powerful centralized authority to create socialist programs like 
the Volks campaign. Private businesses would cooperate with the regime, whether it is through 
force or freewill, to standardized basic goods and make Germany a more affluent society. The 
campaign would benefit the nation by helping erase class divisions and by putting the collective 
need ahead of individual greed. 
Propaganda played a major role in the National Socialists’ rise to power. The party used 
it to influence public opinion and promote their values of unity and collectiveness. Many of the 
posters promoted slanderous feelings towards liberalism, capitalism, and big business.  
The four major themes that recur in Nazi propaganda during this period reflect the roots 
and antecedents of völkisch thought: 1) appeal to national unity based upon the principle: 
'The community before the individual' (Volksgemeinschaft); 2) the need for racial purity; 
3) a hatred of enemies which increasingly centered on Jews and Bolsheviks, and 4) 
charismatic leadership (Fiihrerprinzip).35 
 
Volksgemeinschaft and national unity were values that the regime constantly announced. Hitler 
wanted to destroy class divisions and transform the feeling of alienation into one belonging to a 
pure community, or Volk. In order to revolutionize the nation’s ideology, the party began issuing 
propaganda that urged the population to put “the community before the individual” (Gemeinnutz 
vor Eigennutz) and to place their faith in slogans like “One People! One Reich! One Führer!”36 
After securing power, the Third Reich made it their mission to use legal authority, coercion, and 
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propaganda to coordinate with industry to create standardized versions of key consumer 
commodities, ultimately making the nation more affluent. One aspect of Nazi centralized 
economic policies was that it aimed to cut the nation’s ties with the world market, meaning that 
all Volks products would be created within the nation.  
Political centralization was completely foreign to Germany. The Weimar Republic 
promoted open thinking and free action. But the Nazi regime used their legal authority to create a 
strict macroeconomic agenda that all actors needed to follow. One important part of this plan was 
to cut Germany’s reliance on global connections and international trade, which also represented 
the mood of the public. “The new [Nazi] government also reflected the popular mood of 
economic nationalism, both in its desires to cut Germany off from unhealthy dependence on the 
world economy and in the pursuit of domestic sources of recovery.”37 The liberal policies of the 
Weimar Republic motivated German businesses to pursue financial opportunities in the world 
market, but caused majority of the nation to be susceptible to dangers outside of their control. 
The system resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths during the blockades of World War I and 
a huge rise in unemployment after the Wall Street Crash in 1929.  
The Third Reich represented a completely new and different ideology. The party wanted 
to restructure the nation’s economy by abandoning their current liberal economic model that 
relied on exports and global connections. They believed Germany required state management 
and highly regulated policies if the nation was going to recover and rebuild. Centralized 
economic planning would give the nation a uniform direction and become isolated from the 
world market. Autarky and self-sufficiency were two key elements in the Nazis’ plan to rebuild 
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the nation’s economy because it would allow them to become independent in the production of 
important raw materials.  
Future wars, Hitler believed, had to mobilize “the whole strength of the people.” 
Economic policy, in this sense, had to be judged by the creation of strategic necessity as 
well as social utility. This made Hitler an enemy of free-market economics, and inclined 
him to the currently fashionable ideas of closed economic blocs and autarky, and 
ultimately to the idea of seizing ‘living-space’ and resources by force.38 
 
Centralized planning would strengthen the nation by having all Germans work towards the same 
goal. Liberal and capitalist models have the opposite effect because it motivates businesses and 
citizens to act in their own self-interest, which is why the regime opposed economic liberalism. 
They believed it made the nation weak, divided, and vulnerable in future wars. As a solution, the 
National Socialists issued policies that promoted Volksgemeinschaft, national unity, and self-
sufficiency. Strong government control would make all citizens work towards helping Germany 
become completely sovereign and independent. Hitler believed this would help make Germany a 
strong industrial and military power. By becoming self-sufficient, Germany would be able to 
provide basic resources for the public, resulting in a more stronger and unified community. 
 In 1936 Third Reich issued the Four Year Plan, which was aimed to make Germany self-
sufficient in four years.  Adolf Wagner, read out a proclamation from Hitler at a September rally:  
I today present the following as the new Four-Year Plan. In four years Germany must be 
wholly independent of foreign areas in those materials which can be produced in any way 
through German ability, through our chemical and machine industry, as well as through 
our mining industry. The re-building of this great German raw material industry will 
serve to give employment to the masses. The implementation of the plan will take place 
with National Socialist energy and vigor. But in addition, Germany cannot relinquish the 
solution of its colonial demands. The right of the German people to live is surely as great 
as that of other nations. The success of this plan is merely a question of our energy and 
determination. National Socialists have never recognized the word “Impossible.”39 
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Germany benefited from Nazi centralized economic planning because it created a unified vision 
and gave the nation a purpose, whereas the Weimar Republic caused citizens and private 
businesses to act in selfishly. The advantages of the regime and totalitarianism were that they 
mapped out a future for Germany’s economy. They created a plan would make the nation 
entirely independent from the world market. Instead of worrying about individual relations 
abroad, companies would be working towards benefiting the entire nation.  
 The restrictive regulations issued by the government had a major impact on the attitudes 
of German businesses. The freedoms that these companies experienced during the Weimar 
Republic vanished under the authority of Hitler. The regime monitored and controlled 
Germany’s economy to ensure all actors contributed towards their national goals. They limited 
exports, prevented capital from moving freely abroad, and had foreign earnings locked in bank 
accounts, only to be spent on German goods and services.40 “Under such a system businessmen 
were regarded as economic functionaries serving the interests of the nation rather than as 
independent and enterprising creators of wealth.”41 The Third Reich worked with private 
businesses in order to form close relations. For instance, they appealed to large corporations by 
exempting taxes on profits. Hitler also encouraged businesses to explore the production of raw 
materials by offering them financial support. The goal of the NSDAP was to destroy the nation’s 
dependence on the world market and make them self-sufficient in the production of raw 
materials. For that to be possible, the regime would need to rely on either persuasion or coercion.  
The restrictions and limitations imposed by the regime caused German businesses to 
develop a negative opinion of the party at first. However companies’ resentment towards the 
regime did not concern Hitler because he had the support of the German public. If a business 
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acted in a manner that contradicted with the nation’s goals they would be labeled as enemies of 
Volksgemeinschaft. Hitler never felt threatened by German big businesses because he had 
absolute authority and control over the nation’s military, local governments, and local police. He 
had the ability to crush any business that opposed his policies.  
The Nazi revolution was compounded in to three elements: 1.) The Nazis utilized legal 
authority of the state to legitimize their control over the civil service, police and the 
armed forces. 2.) Use of terror and coercion in the absence of law to create fear 3.) 
Propaganda. A Society that was suffering from a deep sense of national humiliation, and 
weakened by inflation, economic depression and mass unemployment, was perhaps not 
surprisingly attracted to a National Socialist revival that proclaimed that it could integrate 
disparate elements under the banner of national rebirth for Germany.42 
 
The regime fueled their campaign by using anti-liberal, anti-big business, and anti-capitalist 
rhetoric, gaining a great deal of support from citizens who wanted to see a “national rebirth.” The 
Third Reich believed their seizure of power would revolutionize Germany and distant themselves 
from the capitalist polices that once corrupted their nation.  
 The NSDAP monitored Germany and prevent political opposition because they had an 
intricate network of spies. The regime had the allegiance of the nation’s military, local police, 
and local bureaucrats, therefore any attempt at nonconformist behavior would be met with terror 
and violence. The party used their legal authority to issue decrees that ended individual civil 
liberties, including freedom of press, speech, and assembly. Individuals also lost the right to 
privacy, meaning Nazi officials could read people's mail, listen in on telephone conversations, 
and search private homes without a warrant. The party’s strong concentration of power enabled 
the regime to have complete surveillance over the nation; thus making it easier to locate actors 
that opposed the nation’s ideology.  
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 The regime’s absolute authority resulted in a loss of support from large corporations. 
Interessen-Gemeinschaft Farbenindustrie AG (IG Farben), for instance, chemical conglomerate 
that eventually benefited from Nazi rule. But initially divisions separated the company because 
some directors favored the classic liberal economic model that relied on exports whereas others 
favored the new self-sufficient approach.43 In addition, Bosch GmbH opposed Hitler’s principles 
and instead they too believed in the idea of Gewerbefreiheit, or business freedom.44 Yet Hitler 
had support from majority of the nation, allowing him to bully, intimidate, and terrorize 
businesses into sharing his vision. IG Farben felt forced to initiate contact with the regime 
because the party threatened to import cheaper gasoline that would run counterproductive to their 
work.  
 The regime’s ultimate goal was to create a larger and more unified national community. 
To accomplish the nation’s goals Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, used Nazi 
authority and their network of spies to discover what solutions the public wanted to see first.  
Goebbels therefore regularly received (as did all the ruling elites) extraordinarily detailed 
reports from the Secret Police  (SD) about the mood of the people and would frequently 
quote these in his diary. The SD, the Gestapo, the Party, local government authorities and 
the judiciary all made it their business to gauge the mood and morale of the people. Their 
reports were based on information received from agents throughout the Reich who 
reported on their conversations with Party members or on conversations they had 
overheard. It has been estimated that by 1939 the SD alone had some 3000 full-time 
officials and some 50,000 part-time agents.45 
 
The Gestapo, or Secret Police, was an effective tool that allowed them Hitler to penetrate every 
aspect of society. The Gestapo had the authority to investigate cases of treason, espionage, 
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sabotage, and criminal acts against the Third Reich and Germany.46 More importantly, the Nazi 
government passed a law that allowed the group to operate without judicial oversight, meaning 
they had the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings. The Gestapo was a major 
reason for Hitler’s accumulation of absolute authority because anyone politically opposed was 
imprisoned indefinitely.  
The party’s network of spies and officials allowed the NSDAP to measure public 
perception. From the reports, Goebbels was able to conclude that citizens were troubled by the 
unemployment crisis. Thus, Hitler began promising the German public that soon they would be 
back to work. Economic recovery would only occur, Hitler argued, “If measures are taken again 
and again with energetic attacks and fanatical tenacity against unemployment.”47 The regime 
promised to rebuild and revolution the lower-middle class, which suffered immensely from 
unrestricted capitalism and free trade. They would use their power to coordinate efforts with 
private industries and create standardized commodities. The Volksgemeinschaft project and the 
production of the people’s radio, apartment, automobile, and refrigerator would benefit the 
nation in a number of ways. The products would improve national unity, create a more 
independent Germany, raise the standard of living, and resolve the unemployment crisis. Hitler’s 
intention was to attack the labor problem though the Volks program and other state sponsored 
projects. “When he [Hitler] came to power, some 6.04 million people and possibly more were on 
the dole. Twelve months later that figure dropped to 3.7 million.”48  
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One of the Volks products was the creation of a people’s car. Adolf Hitler had been a 
motor enthusiast his entire life and he firmly believed that the car was a great symbol of a 
modern consumer lifestyle. He once said,   
Just as horse-drawn vehicle once had to create paths and the railroad had to build rail 
lines, so must motorized transportation be granted the streets it needs. If in earlier times 
one attempted to measure people’s relative standard of living according to kilometers of 
railway track, in the future one will have to plot the kilometers of streets suited to motor 
traffic.49 
 
Hitler’s ideology was a country’s standard of living could be gauged by their automotive 
industry. Unfortunately, Germany’s was one of the smallest in all of Europe, as seen in Table IV.  
Table IV. Vehicle ownership in Europe and USA, 1935 (per 1,000 pop.) 
Country Vehicles Country  Vehicles 
USA 204.5 Switzerland 21.7 
France 49.0 Irish Free State 17.8 
UK 45.2 Netherlands 17.6 
Denmark 41.6 Germany 16.1 
Sweden 24.4 Italy 9.5 
Norway 22.3 USSR 1.5 
Source: Richard James Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 73. 
*Excluding motorcycles 
 
Germany’s automotive industry and transport sector were hit hard during the depression, 
resulting in production and ownership to fall far behind their European neighbors. “In 1932 there 
were only 486,001 licensed cars in Germany. In Berlin, a city of 4 million inhabitants, there were 
fewer than 51,000 cars.50 To put in perspective in relation to the number of households, there 
was one car for every 37 households in 1933.51 The motor vehicle was a luxury reserved for the 
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German elite, where the marginalized lower-middle class did not have the means to purchase this 
particular product. Germany’s road conditions was also proof that the nation had an extremely 
poor automotive sector. In 1933 only 25% of Germany’s main roads had hardened surfaces that 
could withstand high-volume motor traffic.52 Quite simply, German society was far less wealthy 
and affluent than Britain, France, and the United States when gauging a nation’s standard of 
living through their transport sector.  
 The National Socialists created a motorization program that would raise the German 
standard of living to a level similar to their European counterparts and the United States. They 
would create a huge state sponsored program that would improve the road conditions, increase 
automobile ownership, and resolve the unemployment issue. At the 1934 Berlin Motor Show 
Hitler announced that it was the intention of the:  
National Socialist leadership not only to crank up the economy through the furthering of 
the motor-car sector, giving bread and work to thousands of men, but also to offer ever 
greater masses of people the opportunity to acquire this most modern means of 
transport.53 
 
Motorizing Germany was a “bread and work” project, meaning it would attack the issue of 
employment while also bringing the automobile to the masses. Road building would not only 
give German citizens a sense of literal unity, but also a sense of importance and self-worth. The 
program would bring Germans together from opposite parts of the country to work on a common 
project that unified and benefited the entire collective. The Third Reich deliberately used the 
motor sector and road building to restore the nation’s economy and morale. Between 1932 and 
1935, 60% of the funds released for work creation public works went to transport projects, 
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mainly on roads.54 Roads, which had greatly suffered from the lack of maintenance during the 
depression, were now being repaired by groups of unemployed laborers.  
Senior Nazis were talking before the seizure of power about the place that road building 
would play in Nazi employment policy. Once in power, the Nazi regime used road works 
as a major element in the state-sponsored ‘Battle for Works.55 
 
A major program issued by the national government was the Autobahn, which would be state 
sponsored and call for over 6,500 kilometers (4,309 miles) of road to be paved.56 The regime 
believed that work on this superhighway would cause citizens to feel a part of the grand project 
and a part of Germany’s mission towards achieving Volksgemeinschaft. Centralized economic 
planning made the project possible because it gave the government the power to pool all the 
nation’s resources towards one specific project. The regime’s power and authority played to the 
advantage of the nation because it created a clear vision, which was restore and unite the nation 
through the construction of roads. In addition, the road building helped the nation in becoming 
self-sufficient because it would allow businesses to better communicate and transport goods. 
And it also helped address the unemployment crisis where the autobahn alone employed 992,500 
people.57 
 The Third Reich also stimulated economic activity by offering tax incentives to 
companies willing to invest in the regime’s motorization campaign. Business morale was low 
following the Depression and many companies were unwilling to invest during such unstable 
times. To add, private companies were discouraged to grow and expand because Hitler’s 
economic agenda instilled fear and concern. Thus the regime granted tax concessions for any 
work done in the motor sector in order to stimulate economic activity. The deductions motivated 
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businesses to invest and the nation saw a huge increase in car sales. There were twice as many 
cars produced in 1933 than in 1932, and in 1934 twice as many again.58 The government’s 
willingness to assist in companies’ restoration motivated firms to employ more citizens. Over 
time Germany’s automotive sector became one of their most important sectors in the nation’s 
economy, employing more 1 million citizens, as seen in Table V.  
Table V. Estimated Employment Created by Roads and Cars, 1938 
Reichsautobahnen  120,000 
Ordinary Roads (1936) 40,000 
Motor Industry (excluding parts) 170,000 
Components and Parts 150,000 
Garages (1935) 100,000 
Supply Industry, Roads 250,000 
Motor Trade 60,000 
Chauffeurs, Drivers, etc. (1934)  260,000 
Total 1,150,000 
Source: Richard James Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 73. 
The Nazis restored national morale through their motorization campaign. Germany greatly 
benefited from the party’s policies because they helped restore an economy that was 
apprehensive and depleted. When the National Socialists came to power in 1933, there were 
roughly 6 million people out of work. In twelve months time that figure dropped to 3.7 million.59  
 By 1938, the motor industry had become Germany’s largest manufacturing employer. 
Car production and ownership were higher than what they had been in the last five years. The 
number of registered cars more than doubled from 486,000 in 1932 to 1.271 million by 1938.60  
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Unfortunately Germany was still a poor society and only a small minority of citizens had the 
means to purchase cars. A comprehensive study by the Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung 
discovered that the minimum cost of purchasing a car and running it for 10,000 kilometers per 
year was 67.65 Reichsmarks per month.61 A working class family of four on an income of 2,300 
Reichsmarks per year would have found that, after budgeting for housing, food, and utility bills, 
owning a car consumed their entire disposable income. The price of gasoline in Germany did not 
make car ownership any easier. In the late 1930s the price of a liter of petrol in Germany was 39 
Pfennigs (around $1.70 in 1990).62 At this price, a family traveling 160 kilometers in a car would 
have to use their money earned for an entire day’s work.63 The nation’s automotive sector would 
require strong governmental support if it were to be restored.   
The Third Reich aimed to revitalize the transport with the Volkswagen project, aiming to 
one day have every German citizen own a vehicle. The car would be called Volkswagen because 
it was affiliated with the regime’s Volk campaign that aimed to raise the standard of living of the 
nation through the creation of standardized goods. It would also help destroy class barriers and 
promote national unity by having it be a commodity that every citizen owned. With Volkswagen, 
Hitler envisioned a four-wheel drive 30-bhp car with a three cylinder, air-cooled diesel engine, 
capable of holding two adults and three children. Most importantly, however, was that the cost 
should not exceed 1,000 marks.64 The German nation had mixed emotions about the Volkswagen 
project. The project appealed to the middle class because a motorcar would become an accessible 
purchase. Private businesses, on the other hand, believed that the project was technologically 
impossible and harmful to the nation’s transportation sector. Regardless, Nazi centralization 
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ruled Germany and Hitler had the power dictate what was best for the nation. He did not want 
private businesses to be involved with the production of the car because he feared competing 
interests would cause the program to fail. “It was Hitler’s intention to make certain that what had 
been contributed by the motor car to the revival of the economy should not be allowed to 
lapse.”65 Capitalism had failed the nation before and Hitler was unwilling to let private 
businesses compete over the manufacture of this vehicle. The people’s car was not meant to 
symbolize competition and opposing interests, but rather be a symbol of unification because all 
German’s would own it.  
The Nazis’ policies had an interesting effect on private industrial firms. Many businesses 
were upset with the regime’s rise to power because their policies imposed limitations and 
restricted trade. Companies lost the freedom to trade abroad with foreign markets and instead 
were forced to act in manners that fit with the national agenda. For instance, IG Farben was a 
company that had become globally dominant due to economic liberalism as majority of their 
transactions occurred with foreign countries. They were very tentative to form relations with the 
regime because they feared they would lose some of their independence. However, their attitudes 
quickly changed when they saw the potential profits associated with forming relations with the 
party. IG would develop into the Nazis’ most important business during their reign of power. 
Bosch GmbH was another industrial firm that profited immensely from the Third Reich’s 
policies. The company predominantly focused on the production of electrical and automotive 
accessories. Thus when Hitler offered tax concessions to firms working the motor sector, they 
greatly expanded and became more powerful. However, a major distinction between the two 
firms was that Bosch opposed of forming relations with the regime because the firm disagreed 
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with their beliefs. Instead of forming a connection with the party, Bosch funded a resistance 
movement that aimed to overthrow the Führer.  
Nevertheless, all private industries had interesting and similar experiences under the 
NSDAP. Nazi centralized economic planning benefited Germany at the time because it gave the 
nation a unified economic agenda. The Weimar Republic enabled private businesses to operate in 
ways that were destructive to the welfare of the nation. Hitler changed the nation’s structure and 
forced businesses to conform to the nation’s goals. The party’s highly regulated policies helped 
stimulate the nation’s recovery and put 6 million people back to work. They also put Germany 
on course to become a more affluent society through their Volks campaign. The Volkswagen 
project was particularly significant because it would help restore a motor sector that had suffered 
greatly from World War I. Furthermore, the project positively affected private businesses like 
Bosch GmbH, as they became encouraged to rebuild through the government’s tax incentives. 
Nazi economics also helped strengthen Germany by helping the nation become independent in 
the production of raw materials, destroying their reliance on the world market. The project would 
have a profound impact on private business like IG Farben who felt motivated to explore 
synthetic alternatives.   
However, Nazi centralized rule also had many drawbacks. Private businesses were slowly 
losing their independence and their actions needed conform to national economic goals. German 
citizens also were losing key civil liberties such as freedom of expression because the Third 
Reich wanted to guarantee that no one opposed their policies. Germany was on course to become 
one of the most powerful nations in the world. Ye the moral values associated with their policies 
started to surface and infringe on the basic freedoms of citizens.  
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Chapter 3: A Volkswagen for All 
 
 
During the 1930s motorcycles had a much stronger presence in Germany compared to 
other countries. In 1934, 45 percent of the world’s motorcycles were running in the nation, 
prompting one economic journal to comment, “The German people of the less affluent classes 
have thrown themselves on two wheels to become motorized because they are unable to pay for 
four."66 In 1934, the number of motorcycles in the nation surpassed that of cars by a ratio of 1.3 
million cars to 1.5 million motorcycles, over two-thirds of which were lighter models.67 The 
depression hit Germany hard, resulting in most families only having the option to buy the 
cheaper two-wheel motorcycle. However this form of transportation did not fit in line with the 
Nazis’ vision for Germany. Hitler wanted the nation to become more affluent society, meaning 
the German public needed to be wealthy enough to purchase the more luxurious motorcar.  
After seizing power, the Reich’s main goal was to raise the nation’s standard of living to 
a level more appropriate with their Aryan race, a master race superior to all others. The 
Volksgemeinschaft campaign would create a stronger and more unified nation by erasing class 
divisions. Hitler was embarrassed that German society used motorcycles as a form of 
transportation and attributed this atrocious livelihood to an inadequate amount Lebensraum, or 
living space, which caused their low wages and inability to buy basic consumer goods. In 
Zweites Buch, Hitler’s second book after Mein Kampf, he said, “If the German state could not 
secure sufficient Lebensraum for the German people, all social hopes were utopian promises 
without the least real value.”68 Expanding the nation’s lebensraum was an essential element in 
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the Nazi campaign because more living space meant a greater standard of living. Hitler credited 
the nation’s struggles to an inadequate amount of land. If the nation were going to develop 
further economically, it would need the ability to expand and grow. Thus Hitler issued the 
Volkswagen project, aiming to put a motorcar within financial reach of every German without 
distinction of class, profession, and property.69 The project would motorize the nation and urge 
citizens to expand and gather more resources. In July of 1941, Hitler said,  
More than the railway— which is rather impersonal— automobiles will link people to 
one another. What a step on the way to a new Europe! Just as the autobahns are 
dissolving the internal German borders, so will they surmount the borders of individual 
European countries.70 
 
The road-construction program aimed to resolve the labor crisis and connect the nation. The 
Volkswagen project, on the other hand, would help Nazis’ create a new motorized Europe.  
Former United States President Herbert Hoover had an election slogan that read “a 
chicken in every pot, a car in every garage,” which evoked Hitler to create the German 
equivalent, “ein Volksauto und ein Volkseigenheim für Jedermann”— for everyone a car and 
house of his own.71 According to Hitler, the number of cars and miles of roads measured a 
nation’s cultural standards. The Volkswagen project aimed to restore Germany’s position in the 
world to a point that was more fitting with their superior Aryan race by providing a motorcar to 
the masses.  
 Adolf Hitler decided to work with Ferdinand Porsche, a German engineer, to produce a 
vehicle that had two essential features: four wheels and cost less than 1,000 Reichsmarks.72  
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The regime believed that a four-wheeled car was more appropriate to the cultural level of the 
German people as opposed to the cheaper two-wheeled motorcycle. In 1939, statistically every 
German family owned slightly more than one motorcycle.73 The United States was an affluent 
country and their motorcar ownership trumped Germanys. But Germany needed not worry 
because the Volksprodukt projects (people’s car, radio, apartment, etc.) were harbingers of a new 
future.74 Ideological beliefs fueled the Nazi economy and their economic plans were only 
effective because majority of the nation supported them. The Volkswagen project would boost 
national morale, unify the public, and drive economic improvement. But the German public was 
poor and citizens did not have the necessary capital to purchase a motorcar, which cost 2,000 
Reichsmarks in 1933.75 Low wages forced workers to obtain cheap motorcycles. In 1938 1.3 
percent of car buyers compared to 48.7 percent of motorcycle buyers were workers.76 To make 
the motorcar accesbile, Hitler required that the Volkswagen be sold below 1,000 Reichsmarks 
because the average German was not capable of saving more. The price cap caused Volkswagen 
to become a symbol of unification and equality because all citizens would have the means to 
purchase it.  
 The project required the assistance of the federal government if it had hopes of 
accomplishing some of the goals it set forth. Fortunately, the regime’s concentrated authority 
allowed the party to control and stabilize the cost by reducing the price of resources needed for 
production. A liberal decentralized government like the Weimar Republic would not have the 
power to create a project such as Volkswagen because that political system leads to competing 
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interests. Various actors would try and control, stronghold, or sabotage the project. The Third 
Reich’s unprecedented political authority made the enormous project possible.  
The regime aimed for production to begin in 1940 with 150,000 cars a year and rise to 
1.5 million within two years.77 No private car firm in Germany at the time had the resources to 
achieve such high production quotas. The company’s ambitious goals display the Nazis’ plan to 
launch Germany’s automotive industry into a new era. In a few years time, hundreds of 
thousands of workers and low-level employers would own a car, creating a strong and unified 
nation in the process. At an Automobile Exhibition, Hitler said,  
Over the past four years, and with continual improvements, we have developed the 
Volkswagen, which we are convinced not only can be sold at the price we want, but also 
can be manufactured in ways that use a minimum of workers to produce the maximum 
amount. The model that has resulted from years of work by Dr. Porsche will undergo 
testing this year. It will enable millions of new customers with limited incomes to afford 
a car. We owe the best cars in the world to our directors, engineers, craftsmen, workers, 
and salesmen. Today, I am convinced that in a short time we will also build the least 
expensive cars.78 
 
The regime’s plan was to create a cheap, affordable motorcar by using their centralized control 
and authority; and in process create a stronger, wealthier, and more unified nation that was not 
separated by class distinction.  
 The Volkswagen project planned to set a precedent for future German business in the 
sense that they would be strongly regulated and controlled by the central government. By naming 
the vehicle Volkswagen or the “Strength through Joy Car,” the regime promoted the project as 
something that was beneficial for the greater good of the nation. The project was not about 
individual profit or gain, but rather making the collective nation stronger and more unified. 
Volkswagen was a community project that promoted chauvinism, aiming to create a racial 
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community that was superior to all others in the world. By spearheading the project, the 
government could ensure the project would not be sabotaged by capitalist and corporate greed. 
Volkswagen’s vision was much greater than that as it planned to benefit not just some German 
citizens, but all. Volkswagen was a business venture that took into account the good of the 
nation. A project of this magnitude would only possible through strong government control and 
regulation.  
In order to meet the production goals set forth by the regime, an all-new special purpose 
factory unlike any other had to be built. A completely new and original factory was to be 
constructed to house the project. Once completed, it would require a workforce of thirty 
thousand workers and have the ability to produce close to one million vehicles a year.79 In the 
shadows of the factory, an entirely new city would rise that could accommodate 90,000 
inhabitants.80 The factory would be in proximity to necessary raw materials, such as coal, steel, 
and iron and near a main railroad line, autobahn, and waterway to keep the transportation of 
these materials cheap. The regime used their legal authority and power to bully landowners to 
forfeit their property for the greater good of the project and nation. Count von der Schulenburg, 
one property owner, was required to give up approximately 5,000 acres of his land, whereas 
twenty-eight smaller property holders were also involved making the 10,000 acres available for 
the project.81 The city would become known as the Strength through Joy City and it planned to 
include blocks of apartment houses and two-family residences, park and recreational facilities, 
wide shopping streets, and market places with parking areas.82 The Strength through Joy City 
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would serve as a National Socialist model city for the future because it was a residential center 
that incorporated the Third Reich’s emphasis on unified work.83  
Just as the People’s Car was supposed to be a car that all Germans would drive, Hitler 
wanted its city to be a model on which all industrial towns could be built. It was to be a 
place of common purpose, where men and women worked together toward the realization 
of a singular goal, the ultimate point being the strengthening of Germany.84 
 
The Strength through Joy City aimed to set a precedent for future Nazi industrial businesses, 
uniting German laborers together. Each person would have a special connection with one another 
because they all shared a particular purpose in the production of the people’s car. Hitler’s new 
city and factory model perfectly infused the ideas of loyalty and labor.  
 The design of the city and factory were modeled after the United States.  Hitler attributed 
America’s prosperity to the country’s vast living space, or Lebensraum, and its economic 
resources and huge domestic market.85 Germany could make strides in becoming more affluent 
by modeling their industrial factories and cities from Americas. As Hitler himself put it in a 
passage in Zweites Buch:  
The European today dreams of a standard of living, which he derives as much from 
Europe’s possibilities as from the real conditions of America. Due to modern technology 
and the communication it makes possible, the international relations amongst peoples 
have become so close that the European, even without being fully conscious of it, applies 
as the yardstick for his life, the conditions of American life…86 
 
Hitler believed the United States was an economic powerhouse because their immense living 
space allowed them to construct lavish factories. In the summer of 1936 and 1937, Ferdinand 
Porsche and other Volkswagen officials traveled to America and visited automobile factories 
from Detroit to New York City. The group yearned to see how America lived such a prosperous 
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and affluent lifestyle, and what they discovered was that their means of production were 
incomparable to anything else in the world. Henry Ford’s River Rouge factory, for example, was 
one of the world’s largest factories at the time. 87 In the early 1920’s, the Ford Model T 
embodied the breakthrough to a new era of production.  
At his factories at Highland Park and then on the River Rouge in Detroit, Henry Ford 
pioneered the essential elements of what was soon to become known as “Fordism:” high-
speed assembly driven by conveyor belts; the use of new kinds of high-volume 
production tools, most notably grinders and automatic lathes; the development, wherever 
possible, of special-purpose machinery, designed specifically to optimize production of 
particular standardized products; a ruthless effort to force down the cost of raw materials 
and components through vertical integration from raw materials to final assembly; the 
employment of large volumes of semi-skilled and unskilled labour; and a shop floor 
bargain in which extreme effort levels were traded against astonishing wages.88 
  
Ford’s factory revolutionized industrial business, as it coined mass production through its 
technological innovations of tools and high-speed conveyor belts. The factory had the ability to 
make a mass-produced standardized project at a remarkably low cost, which was what Hitler 
wanted Volkswagen to accomplish. He needed to build a factory that produced one million cars 
per annum and no factory served a better model in the world than the Ford’s in the United States.  
 Nazi officials and Volkswagen technicians did not publicly acknowledge that the River 
Rouge factory served as a template. Hitler praised the Ford Company for what they achieved 
within the transport sector; however the American automobile company was competition and 
Hitler had plans to one day surpass their production levels.89 
Hitler forbade all party offices to buy Ford cars in a secret order in 1936. In 1938, 
Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda stopped newspaper reports on a new cheap car Ford 
planned to produce in the United States, because this might degrade the Volkswagen in 
the German public. In early 1939 it ordered the press to ignore a ceremony held by Ford's 
representative office in Munich.90 
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Powerful centralized control allowed the regime to issue legal decrees and censor news. The 
Nazis’ power allowed them to censor Ford’s presence abroad by forbidding all party officials to 
buy the company’s vehicles. To add, the German media would not acknowledge any of their 
plans and accomplishments. Unprecedented authority was a drawback of political centralization 
because it enabled a few actors to dictate what is right and wrong for the nation. The regime 
believed it was best that German citizens knew nothing about Ford and his automobiles because 
it would only be detrimental to the Volkswagen project. Plus, the Nazis had aspirations of not 
only having all Germans own the product, but eventually all of Europe.  
Volkswagen managers and Nazi leaders, of course, did not reveal the Volkswagen’s 
American roots to the public. Nevertheless, the United States influenced German 
planning and propaganda as the Nazis attempted to surpass American production 
figures…Porsche, however, imagined building 300,000 Volkswagen each year already in 
1934. Hitler went far beyond this. At a time when approximately one million cars were 
operating in Germany, he spoke of three to seven million that would exist in future. The 
Volkswagen alone was to bring millions of new buyers. The Volkswagen company 
oriented its planning toward the Führer’s predictions. Its management intended to 
construct a production site in three sections each with a capacity of nearly 500,000 cars 
per annum. The propaganda, however, emphasized the figure of 1.5 million cars, which 
was greater than Ford's output. DAF-leader Robert Ley boasted that the Volkswagen 
plant would be "not only the largest automobile factory, but the largest factory in the 
world of any kind.91 
 
Nazi centralized planning benefited Germany because it created a clear unified economic 
direction for the nation. The Third Reich used their immense concentrated power and authority 
to create a project that would make Germany’s motor sector into one of the largest in the world. 
One report in Germany believed the nation would have the best highways, lead the nation in car 
racing, and have the world’s largest and most modern car plant.92 "A plan of truly gigantic 
proportions is thus made reality on a scale unprecedented in the history of human 
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development.”93 The regime’s goal was to not merely bring a motorcar to the German public, but 
to completely revolutionize industrial production. Germany was going to set new high standards 
for production quotas and achieve a standard of living higher than any other nation. The regime 
firmly believed that the German Aryan race was superior to all others, and through motorization 
and the Volkswagen project, the National Socialists intended to erect the nation to a place 
parallel to no other country. Volkswagen was possible due to the strong centralized control of the 
Third Reich because their absolute power extended over the entire nation, causing all citizens 
and businesses to share their national vision.  
 Volkswagen would require a great deal of capital. The German Automobile Association 
(RDA) sponsored the project at first because they could provide the materials and tools at a 
reduced overall cost.94 The RDA was an alliance between German automobile firms that 
attempted to pool their resources together to produce a car that cost less than 1,000 Reichsmarks. 
However after years of work the union was unable to construct a design that was below the 
price-cap. Volkswagen was too overwhelming for private enterprises to attempt. In addition, it 
created divisions as some firms tried to dominate the project. At a Berlin Auto Show, Hitler said, 
“There can only be one Volkswagen in Germany, not ten!”95 Volkswagen was not meant to 
create tension throughout the nation, but instead strengthen and improve Germany.  
The Nazi government sponsored the Volkswagen project entirely, as a division of the 
Nazi German Labor Front (DAF) called Strength through Joy financed it. The DAF was a 
corrupt financial empire, imposing monthly fees on German workers and making membership 
mandatory. The organization became one of the largest Nazi organizations, generating more than 
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$200 million a year, because all German workers had no choice but to join.  The capital 
accumulated was essentially free money, and the DAF allocated 10% of the funds towards the 
people’s car project.96 The project was promoted in a way that conformed to Nazi ideology, 
which was by advertising it as a social enhancement rather than something for profit. To hammer 
this idea into the public, the DAF and federal government utilized propaganda.  
The concept of people's products remained a blend of propaganda and illusionary politics. 
In order to win the support of the people, the Nazis propagated consumer goods that were 
much sought after. They symbolized what the regime would give the people in a future 
Nazi society. In his illusion, Hitler actually believed that Germany could be transformed 
into a consumer society under the conditions of autarky and armament- and in 
contravention to Ford's formula of mass production, low prices, and high wages.97 
 
Political centralization allowed the Nazis to concentrate all resources and attention on specific 
issues. The regime greatly emphasized the Volks projects because it would transform Germany 
into a consumer society. A decentralized government, like the Weimar Republic, would have a 
more difficult time organizing a project like Volkswagen because there are so many varying 
actors influencing decision-making. Nazi economic planning was useful because it gave the 
government an immense amount of power and the ability to control all businesses and citizens, 
forcing them to act in a singular unified manner. The regime’s policies, rules, and regulations 
would make the nation more affluent. Hitler did not create Volkswagen as a way to accumulate 
personal wealth, but rather as something that strengthened and improved the entire population.   
 Following the depression, the incomes of German citizens were low. The DAF created a 
savings scheme called the Strength through Joy Savings Book that helped citizens save money 
and purchase the car. The book required customers to make a weekly deposit of 5 Reichsmarks 
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into an account on which they received no interest.98 Once that balanced reached 750 
Reichsmarks, the customer was entitled to their very own Volkswagen motorcar. The savings 
program was important for two reasons. One, the book locked citizens in a non-cancelable, 
nontransferable contract with the government and gave the regime immediate capital to fund the 
project.99 And two, the savings program helped citizens put money away. “There was so much 
propaganda leading up to its introduction that on the day the stamp books were officially 
available, long line snaked around the post offices, where the books could be purchased.”100 By 
the end of 1939, 270,000 people signed up for the contracts, causing the DAF to net 275 million 
RMs in deposits.101 The Strength through Joy Savings Book demonstrates the power and benefits 
of Nazi centralized planning. Hitler was able to create a unified vision and goal for the nation 
and thousands of eagerly citizens signed up. In addition, the regime used their power to benefit 
all of Germany. Hitler genuinely wanted Germany to flourish, which is why he used his political 
power to create the Volkswagen project and help citizens in purchasing the car.  
 The news that Germany had entered into war came as a shock to officials at Volkswagen. 
The company not yet discussed what would happen in a case of war, so the design, construction, 
and plans were all stalled.102 Many workers believed the war would be short and soon they 
would begin producing cars. But what the company did not know was that the Third Reich had 
plans for Volkswagen during the war. “Nazi leaders never stopped envisioning the car's success 
after a victorious war. Victory would supply Germany with cheap foreign labor and unlimited 
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resources, it was argued.”103 When the National Socialists spoke of production figures of 1 to 1.5 
million Volkswagen per year, they now meant a “European” Volkswagen.104 Albert Speer, the 
Minister of Armament, said Hitler planned to manufacture only the Volkswagen and no other 
cars in Germany after the war.105 The war would help Germany expand, providing the nation 
with more resources and better incomes. Germany’s motorization campaign would be given a 
meaning, "A vast homogeneous continental economic space that includes Europe, Africa, and the 
connecting areas of the Near East.”106 The regime invaded Austria and Czechoslovakia to 
increase Germany’s Lebensraum and make the nation more powerful. The expansion would have 
a profound impact on the expectations of Volkswagen, as the KdF factory would become larger 
and more advanced than any other industrial plant in the world. After completion, Volkswagen’s 
factory would produce more than 1 million cars per year at a price of 1,000 RMs. Eventually, all 
German citizens would one and a strong, unified Aryan community would emerge. Germany’s 
invasion of its European neighbors highlights some of drawbacks of Nazi centralized rule. 
Concentrated power and authority enabled a few actors to control the nation, giving them the 
authority to decide what is best for the entire nation. The Third Reich believed Aryans were a 
superior race and they forced this ideology onto the nation. Hitler was able to use his 
concentrated authority to decide what is right and wrong for the nation, meaning he had the 
power to make Germany start a war.  
 Unfortunately World War II lasted much longer than what Hitler and the regime 
anticipated. Only a small section of the KdF factory had been completed and all the funds that 
were allocated for construction had to be used to help the nation’s army. Over time, the firm felt 
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pressure from German armaments department to complete small military tasks like fixing old 
vehicles or producing specific parts. The amounting pressure caused Volkswagen to become a 
military facility when the war showed no plans of ending soon. The plant began to produce fuel 
tanks, airplane wing repairs, bazookas, and 20,000 V1 flying bombs.107 The designs for 
Porsche’s original people’s cars were eventually stripped down and he was forced to begin 
scheming new vehicles that could be used for war.   
The Kübelwagen and Schwimmwagen, both spin-offs of the Volkswagen motorcar, were 
soon produced in the factory. “In 1943, production of the military versions of Porsche’s design 
accounted for 41.5 percent of factory sales, pulling in a total of 93 million RM out of the 225 
million RM the factory made that year.”108 As Volkswagen’s involvement in wartime production 
increased, they became required to use forced labor.  
The use of forced labor spread quickly throughout Germany as Nazi forces captured ever 
more foreign towns and brought people back from them to work in their German plants; 
this was a common practice during the Second World War, not only for Germany but also 
the Allied countries.109  
 
German industrial plants were unable to function without forced labor because Germany had 
been at full employment in 1938. Thus if the regime had aspirations of growing and expanding, 
they would need millions of additional workers. The Strength through Joy Factory needed forced 
labor more than other facilities because the factory had never been fully staffed. In addition, the 
company was a brainchild of Hitler himself; causing the factory to experience an even greater 
extent of Nazi presence and control. 
The Gestapo had its own office there [KdF factory]. Everyone in charge was part of the 
Nazi Party. And there was an additional policing force called the Werkschutz that 
patrolled the plant and the housing compounds and barracks, keeping a close eye on the 
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workers—especially foreign ones—and operating as an instrument of punishment and 
surveillance, ensuring no one could escape. Beatings and brutality were commonplace, 
and for any workers who dared to rebel, including Germans, there were ‘reeducation 
camps’ where, according to the reports of the workers, torture was the norm.110 
 
The Volkswagen’s staff consisted of 80 percent forced workers.111 The working conditions 
imposed in the company’s facilities were dismal, as Hitler’s Mein Kampf was often read over the 
loudspeaker, public humiliations were executed, and many workers were inadequately dressed.  
At first most of the forced laborers were of mixed nationalities, including Poles, French, 
and Soviets. But eventually concentration camp prisoners were used at Volkswagen as well. As 
early as 1941, Henrich Himmler suggested using forced labor to finish building the still-
incomplete city of Strength Through Joy. However, Hitler did not want Jewish people to be in 
the town so the plan was put on hold.112 But as the war progressed and labor needs increased, 
Albert Speer, the head of Nazi Armaments Division, gave official authorization for the use of 
concentration camp inmates in producing vehicles at the plant. Thus in 1944, Jews were taken 
from Auschwitz and sent to The Town of Strength Through Joy Car to build V1 bombs.113  
 Volkswagen had fascinating experiences when examining the effects of Nazi centralized 
economic planning. The Nazis’ plans greatly benefited Germany as they planned to transform 
Germany froma nation that used cheap motorcycles into one that used more expensive 
motorcars. The appeal of a centralized politics is that it gave a few actors the power and authority 
to prioritize projects. Germany’s road conditions were awful following World War I and 
majority of the nation was financially incapable of purchasing a four-wheeled vehicle. The Nazis 
used their power and authority to fix the nation’s poverty by creating a massive socialist 
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program, the Volkswagen project. Volkswagen was made possible due to the immense power 
and strength of the Nazi government, as they could financially support and organize the project. 
The project also shows the intentions of the regime and how they aimed to benefit the nation by 
creating a higher standard of living. Volkswagen would make Germany the most advanced 
nation in the world by destroying class inequalities and creating a strong people’s community.  
However, the experiences of Volkswagen also show the drawbacks of Nazi centralization.  
Their Nazi government had too much power as they had the authority to dictate what is right and 
wrong for all citizens. The regime took away German civil liberties and prevented people from 
owning other motorcars. In addition, the NSDAP controlled the media and censored outside 
about Ford automobiles. Nazi centralized economic planning had many benefits and drawbacks. 
Even though it was wrong for the regime to completely control the nation, their policies put 
Germany’s automotive sector on track to become one of the most powerful in the world.  
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Chapter 4: Farben’s Cooperation Leads to Profit 
 
 
 IG Farben had established itself as one of the most prosperous enterprises in the world at 
the beginning of the 20th century. The company dominated the market for synthetic dyes, and by 
the 1930s they had over two hundred thousand employees with assets totaling over 1.6 billion 
Reichsmarks.114 Their board of executives had always upheld good relations with officials at key 
government agencies during the Weimar Republic, however the company was tentative to 
associate themselves with the Nazi regime. Many directors believed the regime’s centralized 
political approach was counterproductive because it limited trade relations and the market’s 
capabilities. Nevertheless, Hitler was elected chancellor and Germany abandoned capitalism and 
economic liberalism. However the change in the nation’s political structure greatly benefited IG 
Farben, as they became globally dominant in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors.  
Dyes, pharmaceutical drugs, and photographic materials accounted for most of IG 
Farben’s sales prior to Hitler’s rise to power. In 1926 IG Farben embarked on the construction of 
the world’s first facility for coal hydrogenation, the alchemical process through which coal was 
transformed into petrol, because the company believed one day the world would run out of oil 
thus making their synthetic alternative extremely valuable.115 In 1033 IG drafted a memorandum 
projecting a 50 percent rise in fuel consumption by 1937.116 Farben then invested 300 million 
Reichsmarks in Leuna, one of their plants, in hopes that coal-based technology would pay off in 
the future when oil wells dried and fuel prices soared. But the oil plan backfired completely. The 
fear of an oil shortage caused a dramatic wave of prospecting success. Effective drilling in 
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Venezuela, California, Oklahoma, and the Permian Basin in west Texas caused the world market 
for crude to be oversupplied and world price to collapse, leaving IG’s investment in Leuna 
economically irrational. The Third Reich could potentially sabotage IG and their synthetic fuel 
project by importing cheaper gasoline from the world market. 
In the autumn of 1932, two IG men with connections to the far right traveled to Munich 
to brief Hitler on the national importance of their synthetic fuel project.117 The IG officials 
presented their plan by drawing on the Hitler’s interest in self-sufficiency, and the regime agreed 
to help salvage their investment.  
We National Socialists have the intention of generally expanding the German raw 
material base… from this position it is a matter of course that we desire an increase in the 
production of petrol from German raw materials. From a purely economic point of view 
it would be wrong to produce petrol domestically at a price of 19 Pfennigs, when the 
world market is 5 Pfennigs. But I have declared to the importers, what guarantees can 
you give me for the maintenance of world peace? For us National Socialists, apart from 
economic criteria… military reasons are decisive. I am therefore determined to promote 
fuel production from German raw materials by all means and to provide necessary and 
sales guarantees.118 
 
The Nazi regime and IG Farben formed an agreement and created a scheme to produce several 
million tons of synthetic fuel.119 Economically, it would be wiser for the nation to import cheaper 
oil from the world market. However IG knew that did not fit with Hitler’s vision for Germany.  
Farben initiated the project from a capitalist perspective believing that oil would 
eventually become depleted and the company would profit immensely from the synthetic 
substitute. Once it became clear that their theory was false, Farben sought support from Hitler 
and the Nazi government as a bailout and insurance blanket. IG was not interested in the Nazi 
principles or ideas. But forming a relationship with the regime would save their poor investment 
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by ensuring the nation did not import oil. Thus a strength of a centralized government the power 
they have the power to support and finance companies. Hitler believed decentralization and 
capitalism failed because it caused businesses to be greedy and left the nation vulnerable to their 
irrational actions. The regime’s concentration of power gave them the authority to support 
businesses, like IG Farben and their investment in synthetic technologies. The Third Reich 
decided that self-sufficiency and independency from the world market was important, thus they 
salved IG’s investment for the greater good of the nation.  
 Farben and their relationship with the NSDAP would have been much different had they 
not sought out the party’s support. In February of 1933, the regime summoned twenty-five 
businessmen to explain their policies and vision for the nation.  
The invitees included leaders of German industry, men such as Georg von Schnitzler, 
second in command at IG Farben, Krupp von Bohlen, who was both head-by-marriage of 
the Krupp empire and the current chairman of the Reich industrial association, and Dr 
Albert Voegler the CEO of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the world’s second largest steel 
firm… As in his national address on 1 February, his [Hitler’s] central theme was the 
turning point in German history marked by the defeat and revolution of 1918. The 
experience of the last fourteen years had shown that ‘private enterprise cannot be 
maintained in the age of democracy.’120 
 
At this meeting, Hitler vehemently expressed his attitudes toward the liberal left and warned 
businesses, like IG Farben, that he planned to show no mercy towards anyone that favored 
economic liberalism. Private enterprise and capitalism failed Germany in the past and it was time 
for the nation to take a new direction. The National Socialists wanted a highly centralized 
government that controlled and regulated business transactions. Through absolute authority, 
coercion, and terror, the Nazi regime ensured that companies endorsed their political agenda.  
The Third Reich agreed to support IG’s Leuna synthetic fuel project, thus helping 
Germany take steps toward becoming independent and self-sufficient in the production of raw 
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materials. The basis of the contract were a commitment by IG to expand its facilities at Leuna to 
a capacity of 35,000 tons per annum, in exchange for a guarantee by the Reich that IG would 
make a profit of at least 5 percent on the capital invested. Any profits in excess of 5 percent 
would become the Party’s.121  
The change in power of January 30, 1933, posed a challenge for the top IG Farben 
managers, and the members of the combine’s Central Committee felt compelled to take 
considerable efforts to show their loyalty to the new regime and gain influence over the 
key economics policymaking interfaces.122 
 
When Hitler became chancellor Germany’s entire economic structure was changed. Local 
governments and private businesses were cut out of the national decision-making progress. IG 
began forming connections with the regime to retain some of that power in influencing economic 
policies.  
Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank for the Nazi regime, received contributions 
from seventeen business groups following their meeting in 1933. The largest came from IG 
Farben at 400,000 Reichsmarks. According to a file kept by the IG Central Committee, IG 
donated more than 39.6 million Reichsmarks to the Nazi party by the end of World War II with 
payments made to the NSDAP, SS, SA, and mostly the Nazi movement’s mass and professional 
organizations.123 By the end of World War II, no company would donate to the party and benefit 
from their policies more than IG Farben. The National Socialists never wanted a big business to 
influence the course of government as it directly did during the liberal Weimar Republic. To 
ensure this, the party planned to accumulate unprecedented and persuade private enterprises into 
sharing their national  vision.  
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What Hitler’s regime positively enabled German business to do was to recover from the 
disastrous recession, to accumulate capital and to engage in high-pressure development of 
certain key technologies: the technologies necessary to achieve the regime’s twin 
objectives of increased self-sufficiency (autarchy) and rearmament.124 
 
Businesses were persuaded into investing in technologies that helped Germany become 
independent from foreign relations. The Third Reich motivated companies to improve the 
nation’s wellbeing and raise their standard of living, which is what happened with IG Farben. 
The synthetic fuel project was supported because it would benefit the entire German collective. 
Once IG saw how profitable relations with the NSDAP was, they became heavily intertwined in 
their policies. For instance dyes, drugs, photographic materials, and fertilizers accounted to 70% 
of IG Farben’s sales in 1936. That figure dropped to as low as 31% in 1939.125 This decrease is 
because IG Farben began concentrating attention on projects that the Nazis promoted. For 
instance, IG expanded their synthetic fuel project because the regime took away part of the risk 
of their investment. The regime also helped businesses by not taxing companies on profits that 
were earned at making the nation more self-sufficient. Thus IG started to produce more raw 
materials, such as heavy chemicals, light metals, technical nitrogen, and synthetic fibers, fuel, 
and rubber. Benzin (synthetic fuel) and Buna (synthetic rubber) previously accounted for none of 
Farben’s earnings in 1933. Ten years later they brought in more than 20 percent of the combine’s 
proceeds.126 The Nazi regime offered incentives for business who were willing participate in 
their national vision. IG Farben took advantage of those incentives and concentrated their 
business around the production of material, causing them to greatly profit.  
Following their huge donations to the party, top IG officials began heavily promoting the 
party’s principles in hopes that IG would have an opinion in future legislative decisions.  
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Management and personnel [of IG] moved to effect a rapid Nazification on all levels of 
the concern. Top executives and plant managers demonstrated their support for the Nazi 
government in the company’s bodies and committees. With these internal 
assurances, Carl Bosch and Carl Duisberg were freed to go to the public and use nearly 
identical phrases in telling how highly they valued the new regime, because it was finally 
taking strong measures and letting actions follow on its words. By late 1936 eight 
members of the board and/or the Central Committee had joined the NSDAP. One-third of 
the members in each of these executive bodies were now a registered National 
Socialist.127 
 
Centralized governments excluded majority of the nation from the decision-making process. 
Thus IG Farben began campaigning and promoting the regime’s policies in hopes that they 
would break into the inner-circle that dictated the direction of Germany. Many of IG’s top 
officials thus became party members because they believed it would help advance their business, 
giving them a greater say in the nation’s agenda.  
A major issue with the Volkswagen project was the cost. Hitler adamantly demanded that 
the vehicle be below 1,000 Reichsmarks so the public could afford it. But the main reason the 
vehicle had to be so cheap was because the price for oil in Germany was so much high. As 
mentioned, the prospecting success of drilling companies caused the price for oil in the world 
market to become extremely low. The price of a liter of petrol in the Gulf of Mexico varied 
between 2 and 3 Pfennigs, which was around 10 percent of the price charged to German 
motorists.128 After allowing for shipping and the cost of distribution and marketing, the cost of 1 
liter of petrol was around 20 Pfennigs.129 Germany, however, charged 39 Pfennigs per liter 
because they did not have oil-drilling sites like South America and the United States. With such 
a high price for oil, Germans had a difficult time purchasing and operating cars. In addition, IG 
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Farben did not have the resources or technology to produce synthetic oil at such a low price. 
Therefore the Nazi regime used their power to expand IG and lower the price for German oil.  
 When the National Socialists and IG formed their partnership, they were committed to 
expanding IG’s Leuna facilities and increasing their capacity. At the time, IG and the Nazis 
agreed that the factory would produce 350,000 tons of synthetic oil per annum. However Hitler 
was concerned with those figures because they would only be a small step towards self-
sufficiency. To satisfy the demands that Hitler expected in the future, the regime announced the 
Four Year Plan. The core of the plan was to increase the domestic production of important raw 
materials such as synthetic rubber, fuel-oil, and iron ore, which were all essential resources for 
war. Thus in the following years, Germany began building refineries, aluminum plants, and 
chemical factories. The country needed to increase its production in raw materials if it expected 
to expand its borders and avoid military blockades similar to World War I. With the 
announcement of the plan, IG and the Nazi regime took on a new intensity.  
In late April of 1936 [Carl] Krauch took over the research and development section of 
Hermann Göring's new Raw Materials Office, which became the central component of 
the Four Year Plan organization unveiled five months later. As a result Carl Krauch 
became one of the two or three most powerful businessmen ever to serve in the economic 
hierarchy of the Third Reich. Charged with achieving maximum possible national self-
sufficiency in some thirty major products (ranging from oil, rubber, and textiles to fats, 
albumen, and animal fodder), he and his staff allocated an average of 47 percent of 
annual German industrial investment between 1936 and 1939, exclusive of the coal and 
electrical industries, and a total of some $3.5 billion in investment funds by 1942. At least 
half of this massive flow of capital was earmarked for fields in which Farben 
produced.130 
 
Previous IG employees were breaching into the Hiter’s inner circle. Carl Krauch previously 
served as IG’s executive director where he knew a great deal of information about the company 
and their capabilities. Now, he had control of 47% of the Germans annual industrial investment. 
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A main reason for Farben and the Nazi regime becoming so close was because former IG 
employees became part of the centralized group that made national decision.  
Raw materials are an essential commodity for any nation preparing to go to war. At the 
time of World War II a number of countries invested huge amounts of capital into chemical and 
industrial businesses that produced these important goods. Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a 
British Chemical company at the time, expanded greatly during the wartime period where in 
1937 the British government entirely sponsored the production of eighteen new factories. During 
the war, the number of ICI’s government plants increased to twenty-five and they supplied 
nearly all their nation’s explosives, incendiary bombs, ammonia, chlorine, metal alloys, and 
basic chemicals.131 Similar to IG, former ICI employees were elected to state and national 
bureaucratic positions, including two members of the board of directors, five heads of production 
groups, and thirty-three middle managers and chemists sent to ministries, along with 3,345 
trained personnel assigned to run the government installations.132 The company, which had 
invested a great deal in Britain’s war effort, placed employees in governmental positions to have 
an influence on legislative decision-making and policy creation. In a similar situation, Dupont, 
an American chemical company, had the same increase in production and government support 
that IG Farben and ICI experienced during World War II. Following the events of Pearl Harbor, 
the US company expended almost $222 million on factories commissioned, paid for, and owned 
by the United States government.133By the end of the war, the firm had participated in erecting 
fifty-four new factories primarily across the relatively unindustrialized South and West.134 IG 
Farben, ICI, and DuPont all had similar experiences during World War II by becoming 
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components and beneficiaries of their respective nation’s war efforts. “Stimulated by patriotism 
and pubic pressure, the firms traded their skills and some of their autonomy for victory, good 
will, and growth.”135 Each company profited by having production and expansion sponsored by 
the national government. Nazi Germany promoted jingoistic principles concerning a superior 
Germany and the Aryan race. Thus, IG Farben created a relationship with the regime because it 
allowed them to profit and expand from their policies.  
Table VI. Growth of IG Farben, DuPont, and Imperial Chemical Industries 1929-1943 (‘000)a 
 Employment Assets Sales 
Year IG DP ICI IG DP ICI IG DP ICI 
1932 68 80 63 83 110 N/A 62 61 96 
1938 138 120 116 89 150 N/A 116 116 151 
1943 204 180 236 155 203 N/A 219 302 318 
 Gross Operating Profit Net Operating Profit Dividends 
Year IG DP ICI IG DP ICI IG DP ICI 
1932 49 68 111 38 48 108 50 50 84 
1938 169 161 161 153 158 146 57 68 114 
1943 350 577 291 470 241 108 85 91 114 
Source: Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, (Cambridge UP, 1987), 331. 
 
As Table VI indicates, each company experienced huge growths during the wartime period 
because there was such a high demand for raw materials. Gross profit, employment, and sales all 
greatly grew for each chemical firm from before the war in 1932 to during the war. The table 
shows how much chemical and industrial companies grew from when a nation needed to prepare 
for war. State sponsorship led IG, ICI, and DuPont to greatly expand and prosper because they 
were financed by the national government. When the Four Year Plan was established in 
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Germany, IG would have been foolish had it not tried to capitalize on the opportunity and benefit 
from the policy.  
Henry Stimson, an American politician during the 1930s and 40s, once said, “If you are 
going to… go to war… as a capitalist country, you have to let business make money out of the 
process or business won’t work.”136 This was true for a democratic and free state like the United 
States and Great Britain, but certainly not for Germany. Hitler opposed laissez-faire ecnomics 
because destroyed nationalism and left the country susceptible to dangers outside their control. 
The NSDAP used their power to strongly regulate the economy, and forced private businesses to 
share their vision through legal authority and coercion. Following the announcement of the Four 
Year Plan, Adolf Hitler issued a “Führer Decree” appointing Hermann Göring as the “Trustee of 
the Four-Year Plan,” giving him extensive authorities compared to all other agencies of the 
Reich.137 The Plan empowered directors with the authority to issue legal decrees and general 
administrative regulations to force private enterprises to support the Nazi agenda. Nazi officials 
became able to bully big businesses into expanding factories geared towards the production of 
synthetic rubber, textiles, fuel, and other raw materials.  
As previously mentioned, Hitler was concerned with the inadequate scale of production 
at IG’s Leuna factory. At the time hydrogenation plants were expensive, costing between 250 
and 300 million Reichsmarks for the first stage of production.138 The state could have provided 
funding for the project, however they had other pressing commitments. As a result, Hitler called 
for a conference from the leading industrialists in the coal and mineral oil business to appeal to 
their interest. Hitler expected the companies to make contributions and share their vision of 
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Volksgemeinschaft and self-sufficiency. But industrialists were taken back by this request, 
believing coal hydrogenation was uneconomic and the donating such large quantities of capital 
would prevent them from taking advantage of other opportunities in the course of the economic 
recovery.139 Hitler was frustrated with the response he received, causing him to resort to the 
government’s authority and force cooperation.    
Having failed to obtain voluntary agreement, they [the Nazis] had the ministry draft a 
Decree for the Creation of Compulsory Economic Associations in the Brown Coal 
Industry (Verordnung ueber die Errichtung wirtschaftlicher Pfichtgemeinschaften in der 
Braunkohlenwirtschaft). Ten leading coal-mining corporations were conscripted on 
October 1934 to form the Braunkohlenbenzin AG (Brabag). Each was instructed to make 
out a check for at least 1 million Reichsmarks for immediate use. When more coal 
companies were added in November, Nazis threatened both unlimited fines and 
imprisonment for anyone refusing to cooperate. To satisfy the demands of the military, 
three new synthetic fuel plants built under the license from IG Farben were to be brought 
into operation by 1936.140 
 
Nazi centralized control allowed the regime to use legal documents to force businesses to 
comply. At first, the Third Reich typically let private businesses act on their own free will, such 
as the case with the industrial miners. However when voluntary agreement failed, the regime 
used their concentrated power to force support. A benefit of Nazi centralization was that it 
caused all citizens and businesses to contribute towards one national goal, therefore making 
projects more efficient and effective. On the other hand, centralized politics limited business 
freedom and caused companies to lose part of their independence.  
Farben expanded with the help of Nazi political authority and coercion. By 1939 the 
company had twelve operational hydrogenation plants producing gasoline and mineral oils, with 
a total capacity of 3.85 million tons a year.141 In addition, they started developing other important 
raw materials such as synthetic rubber in their Buna facilities. For Germany to become 
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completely independent and self-sufficient, the nation would need to cut all ties with the world 
market. As Table VII indicates, the number of natural rubber imports per year was at an all time 
high when the Four Year Plan was established. Over time, those figures drastically dropped as 
the production of Buna rose through the guidance of the German government. 
Table VII. Rubber production with the Four Year Plan 
000 tons Natural rubber imports Buna 
1932 50 0 
1933 61 0 
1934 72 0 
1935 74 0 
1936 83 1 
1937 100 4 
1938 92 6 
1939 77 22 
1940 19 41 
1941 27 71 
1942 24 101 
1943 8 120 
Source: Adam J. Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, (New York: 
Viking, 2007), 228. 
 
The table also shows that IG reinvested capital into sectors that were important to the Nazi 
vision. Before Hitler came to power, no company produced Buna. But after Hitler announced the 
Four Year Plan, IG was motivated to partake in rubber production because the regime offered tax 
deductions. The plan led IG to accumulate immense wealth. From 1939 to 1943 the firm saw its 
revenues from synthetic fuels alone more than double from 162 million RM to 351 million 
 61 
RM.142 The increase in production can be attributed to a number of factors, however Nazi 
centralized economic planning certainly played a part.  
Similar to other German industries, the Nazi government had a plan for IG Farben during 
the outbreak of World War II. Whenever the Wehrmacht conquered another country, IG Farben 
followed and systematically took over the facilities. They participated in the plunder of Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France, and a number of other countries  
The leading bodies of I.G. generally would not wait long for negotiations to show results. 
Instead, using their experiences with Austria and Aussig-Falkenau as the templates, I.G. 
would dispatch sales and technical personnel immediately to newly-occupied territories, 
where they would work with the military’s economics command in locating the plunder, 
advising in the resumption of production and preparing to take over ownership. These 
preparations served to greatly increase I.G. Farben’s chances of taking over targeted 
properties.143 
 
The regime was synchronizing military and economic expansion by conquering foreign areas and 
allowing IG officials to follow and seize ownership of chemical plants. The Third Reich invaded 
neighboring countries in hopes of expanding Germany’s border and raising their living standards 
to a position more suitable for the Aryan race. IG benefited from Germany’s expansion because 
it allowed them to conquer factories, thus becoming larger.  
When Austria became annexed into the German Third Reich in 1938, Farben began to 
develop the idea that they could completely dominate the world market for all chemical products.  
The I.G. combine lost no time in pursuing a “new order” for the chemicals industry in the 
annexed territories, starting in Austria with a rapid takeover of the Skoda Wetzler AG 
nitrates plant and its subsidiaries. I.G. Farben had first bought into Skoda Wetzler in 
January 1938, before the occupation of Austria; it acquired the rest of the shares from 
Kreditanstalt-Bankverein in June, a few months after it. The Jewish executives Isidor 
Pollak and Franz Rottenberg (both of whom the Nazis had already arrested) and all other 
“non-Aryan” personnel were immediately fired. Hans Kühne, the director of I.G.’s Lower 
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Rhine region, was named as the new head manager of the Skoda Wetzler plants. Four 
months later, I.G. Farben took over the Austrian holdings of the Slovakian munitions 
maker, Dynamit Nobel Bratislava. These were merged with Skoda Wetzler to form a new 
subsidiary of I.G. Farben, Donau Chemie AG.144 
 
Similar to the Nazis’ idea of New Order with the creation of a pan-German racial state, IG 
Farben looked to establish a complete and absolute monopoly over the production of all raw 
materials. The company did not agree with nor did they support all of the party’s principles, but 
they were also unable to change the political system that governed Germany. Instead of looking 
at their situation morally, IG decided to form relations with the regime because of the possible 
financial gains.  
In the winter of 1940-41 the NSDAP was concerned about the long-term raw material 
situation. Germany needed to produce rubber and oil at a more rapid pace to keep up with the 
country’s growing territory. Thus in February 1941 Hitler set fuel expansion targets that aimed to 
raise Germany’s fuel production from 4.3 million tons in 1941 to more than 6 million tons by 
1943. The longer-term goal was to achieve production of more than 10 million tons of oil by 
1945.145 As Germany expanded, Hitler developed a plan to build a state-of-the-art chemical 
facility in Poland called IG Auschwitz. The factory would be situated on the ground level, close 
to coalfields, and with an excellent access to railways and water. The budget for the Auschwitz 
plant was set at 776 million Reichsmarks, making it the largest single investment in the entire 
portfolio of the Four Year Plan.146 
In fact, I.G. Auschwitz was designed from the very first to be an extremely complex 
chemical factory, producing, besides Buna, high-performance fuels (including aviation 
gasoline and fuel oil for naval use), various plastics, synthetic fibers, stabilizing agents, 
resins, methanol, nitrogen, and pharmaceuticals.147 
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The factory would make an annual total of 30,000 tons of Buna, helping satisfy the military 
demand for fuel and Buna. When the war ended, the regime wanted the facilities at Auschwitz to 
make a switch to high-pressure Reppe chemistry and the promising manufacture of plastics.148 
Otto Ambros, a member of the IG executive board, believed the Buna plants were a “starting 
point for aldehyde chemistry, for solvents, plastics, resins, or softening agents.”149 But as 
fighting progressed labor shortages made it difficult for Farben and other industrial businesses to 
reach their production quotas. The German Reich began to rely on forced labor in an attempt to 
resolve the issue. 
Before the war, the National Socialists used forced labor to reprimand those who did not 
agree with the their vision of Volksgemeinschaft. However once World War II started, it had 
become a staple of the German Reich war economy and a tool for systematic exploitation for 
those who were viewed as racially inferior. The country had been suffering from labor shortages 
from as early as 1937 when there was a high demand for workers in IG’s major building sites. In 
response, war prisoners were sent to fill the void. The foreign laborers made it very difficult for 
IG to conduct business effectively. Skilled and relatively well-treated western Europeans tended 
to slack off and the ill and malnourished were incapable of efficiently executing their duties.150 
The inadequate number of workers made it difficult to erect the new IG Auschwitz Buna plant, 
which was initially planned to be complete in two to four years. Thus, Krauch ordered that the 
SS provide the largest possible number of inmates for work on the site. To stress the urgency of 
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the project, Krauch warned Nazi officials in charge of construction that, “It must never happen 
that, for some reason, you show delay in employing the workers assigned, either because they do 
not include as many skilled workers as you wish or because of lack of housing.”151 In other 
words, anything goes.  
Farben’s selection of Auschwitz may not have been contingent on the presence of the 
concentration camp that was already established there. Surviving records suggest that the 
regime’s insistence on an eastern location and specific geographic assets attracted Ambros and 
IG before the possibility of employing inmates emerged.152 Regardless, the combine’s decision 
to occupy the site contributed mightily to the camp’s expansion and its eventual evolution into a 
death manufacturer. The Nazis’ plan was to create a hub for housing around the industrial plant 
that could accommodate 30,000 prisoners after the war was finished. The NSDAP promised to 
furnish gravel and other basic materials, to supply, train, guard, and help feed up to 1,500 skilled 
inmates during 1941 and to double that number by 1942, and to construct a bridge and rail spur 
linking the camp with the construction site. In return Farben would pay the SS 3 to 4 marks for 
each worker’s eleven-hour shifts.153 But problems arose during the construction process. First, 
the regime’s inability to construct a fence around the work area made inmates only employable 
during the daylight. Secondly, security guards administered frequent beatings to prisoners, which 
had a demoralizing effect on others.  
By mid-1942 Farben’s Auschwitz plan had fallen badly behind schedule. From IG’s 
perspective, the fault lay with the Nazis and their failure to provide or transport essential 
materials and labor. As fighting progressed it became clear that World War II would do to Buna 
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what World War I had done to dyes: create overseas competitors and reduce future markets. The 
United States, for example, was investing more than $700 million dollars into the manufacture of 
synthetic rubber.154 IG Farben began to realize it no longer had a dominant position in the world 
market in regards to the production of Buna. Farben worried about their investment because they 
were stuck between the regime’s priority, immediate output, and their objective, ultimate 
competitiveness. Yet IG had committed too much economically and politically to reverse its 
course. The stalling of construction and the concern about their position in the world market led 
to the barbarization of IG-Auschwitz.155 As impatience with construction grew, conditions for 
laborers worsened. Thousands of available beds in barracks could not be occupied because 
latrines, baths, and kitchens were absent. Workers were not supplied with shoes or socks. By 
November of 1942, nineteenth months after IG and the Nazis agreed on the project, the 
construction had only just begun. To expedite the process, Farben proposed that the SS sanction 
systems of bonuses and extra rations and offer early release from work for particularly 
productive inmates.156 These suggestions led to improvements in labor efficiency and eventually 
sub camps, like Monowitz, formed in 1942 that were to provide slave labor for the Buna 
industrial complex. By winter of 1943, the worsening work conditions and deterioration of 
inmates’ health provoked the first systematic “selection” at Monowitz. The horrific relationship 
between IG Farben, the NSDAP, and mass extermination was created. 
Able-bodied Jews were brought from Auschwitz, billeted three to a bed in stifling and 
verminous barracks, provided minimal food and clothing supplements to the standard 
camp issue, subjected to lengthy predawn roll calls in all sorts of weather, and put to 
work on eleven-hour shifts hauling or carrying heavy loads at a trot. Within three to four 
months of their arrival, such treatment literally consumed the inmates, reducing them to 
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walking skeletons. Those who did not drop dead were sooner or later reclaimed by the SS 
and gassed. Either way, they were replaced, and the cycle resumed.157 
 
Through this rotation, more than 35,000 people were passed through Monowitz during 1943 to 
1944; the toll of confirmed deaths are estimated at 23,000, or an average of 32 per day.158 So 
long as IG-Auschwitz maintained the flow of able-bodied workers, IG’s managers morally 
excused themselves of allowing the prisoner’s fate to lie with the regime. 
 Zyklon B, a granular vaporizing pesticide, was being used to asphyxiate and kill the Jews 
at Auschwitz’s concentration camp in mass numbers. Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Schädlingsbekampfung mbH (Degesch), a subsidiary of IG Farben, controlled the production of 
this deadly chemical. IG had some control in Degesch’s business where their 42.5% of the 
company’s stock translated into three seats on their Administrative Committee, which were 
occupied by IG members Heinrich Hoerlein, Karl Wurster, and William R. Mann.159 However, 
the group ceased to meet after 1940 and it is not certain that IG’s members condoned the 
poisonous chemicals use at the Auschwitz concentration camp. Zyklon B would have been 
produced during World War II because it could be used to disinfect barracks, ships, and freight 
cars. It was this high level of toxicity that led the SS to test the substance on 850 Soviet prisoners 
in 1941. Therefore IG may never have known of its use in Auschwitz because the SS had never 
consulted with either Farben or Degesch about the construction of gas chambers at concentration 
camps.160 “After learning in June 1943 from Kurt Gerstein of the SS that Zyklon had been used 
to murder ‘large numbers of people… criminals, mental cases, and so on,’ the general manager 
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of Degesch, Gerhard Peters, allegedly kept an oath of secrecy.”161 Officials from both Degesch 
and IG Farben had no knowledge about the use of the deadly chemical; and in the postwar trials 
no proof emerged that IG senior executives and directors knew about Zyklon B’s use in Nazi 
extermination camps. 
 IG Farben saw the advantages of Nazi centralized economics, causing them to form close 
ties with the regime. IG originally opposed the regime’s rise to power, which was the general 
mood of most private industries because the NSDAP limited Germany’s trade opportunities. But 
Farben developed connections with the regime because they believed they could greatly profit. 
The company bought into the nation’s Four Year Plan and expanded its facilities to meet the 
demands of the Reich. Many Farben employees became official members of the Nazi party 
because they hoped the company could influence national decision-making. IG Farben would 
eventually become one of the largest and most dominant corporations in the world because they 
restructured their business to support Hitler. The firm traditionally produced dyes, 
pharmaceuticals, and photographic materials, but abandoned those products when the regime 
offered incentives for work in the production of raw materials. Farben experienced immense 
profits when they switched to the production of oil, rubber, and other goods. The experiences of 
IG Farben showcase the benefits and drawbacks of Nazi centralized economic planning and the 
effects policies had on industrial businesses. Farben’s experiences are unique because the firm 
was so involved in the regime’s policies. But nonetheless, their experiences prove that Nazi 
centralization had a positive impact on Germany’s economy, except destroyed business freedom.  
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Chapter 5: Bosch’s Minimal Compliance 
 
 
 By 1913, Robert Bosch GmbH was a global company that had branch operations in 
America, Asia, Africa, and Australia. The firm was heavily involved in the foreign market and 
generated 88% of its sales outside Germany.162 The firm focused primarily on the production of 
electrical and automotive accessories, including brakes, headlights, steering systems, and fuel 
and ignition systems. They benefited greatly from the nation’s liberal economic model and had 
trade connections throughout the world. However, the economic crisis in the 1920s had a 
crippling effect on the automotive industry, causing Bosch GmbH to suffer huge losses. In the 
period between 1925 and 1926, sales for Bosch dropped by 35 percent, resulting in associates to 
be laid off and work in the plants to be cut back to three days a week.163 To add, the company 
was forced to cut senior level executives as the board of managements was stripped from eleven 
members to just three members and three deputies.164  
The economic crisis caused Bosch to begin a rigorous program of modernization and 
diversification by expanding beyond the automotive market. In 1927 Robert Bosch, founder of 
Bosch GmbH, said, “We ourselves are trying to move away from automotive work if we can, 
or, to be more precise, to add more strings to our bow.”165 Bosch believed the company’s heavy 
reliance on the transportation sector limited their potential. Thus they gradually turned to the 
production of household electrical appliances and began working with refrigerators, radio parts, 
televisions, and hand tools. The company also started to cooperate with competitors both in and 
outside Germany, hoping to secure a firm position on the international stage. In 1924, Bosch 
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merged with Eisemann, a Stuttgart-based company that manufactured products of similar nature. 
In 1928, they began a new joint venture with Lavalette in Paris, France. And in 1931, they 
partnered with British competitor Joseph Lucas Ltd and became CAV-Bosch and began 
producing fuel injection pumps.166 By collaborating with foreign enterprises, the company was 
able to avoid high import tariffs. Economic liberalism and unrestricted capitalism permitted 
Bosch to freely operate in the foreign market without obstruction. The liberal economic structure 
helped them grow and profit.   
 Robert Bosch himself was a pacifist and pan-European; and he frequently spoke out 
politically in hopes of creating a united and peaceful European continent. In World War I many 
of Bosch’s close associates were killed. The huge divisions that formed between France and 
Germany prompted Bosch to become a dedicated supporter of international rapprochement. In 
the spring of 1932, Robert Bosch drafted a memorandum hoping to make “Europe one big 
economic block.”167 He believed Gewerbefreiheit, or business freedom, would create a stronger, 
more united and peaceful Europe. Decentralization and liberalism would motivate businesses to 
form connections with foreign nations, resulting in peaceful alliances. Bosch’s political activism 
caused the company to get off on the wrong start when Hitler was named chancellor of the Reich 
in 1933. Hitler and Bosch had virtually opposite political viewpoints, Bosch advocated for 
business freedom and free trade, whereas Hitler supported heavy restrictions and independency 
from the world market. Thus when the NSDAP consolidated power over Germany, Bosch and 
his colleagues remained silent. For example, when the Nazis ordered a number of chief German 
industrialists to attend a meeting in Berlin to hear Hitler discuss the party’s principles, Bosch 
refused to attend. On February 20, 1933 Bosch wrote,  
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If I am not able to participate in an open discussion, with an exchange of views in which I 
can present the Chancellor with my profound concerns and the reasons for them; in a 
conversation at which many people are present I will certainly not accomplish 
anything,168  
 
Hitler’s authoritative and coercive rule did not allow oppositionists like Bosch to express their 
concerns about the regime’s highly regulated and limited market. Thus rather than say something 
wrong, Bosch kept most of his ideas concerning foreign policy and liberalism dormant.  
Eventually Hitler learned about Bosch’s political views and he invited him to schedule a 
time to meet. In a letter dating back to September 9th 1933, Bosch wrote,  
Perhaps I will succeed in making a certain impression. He is said to know me very well 
by my actions… Earlier on, I was laughed at on account of my position on the social 
question, made fun of and hated. Today I seem to be recognized for it. If I could be of 
some use in that way, you have no idea how happy it would make me.169 
 
Bosch’s political views of rebuilding relations with France were unpopular because citizens were 
still upset with the harsh reparations issued by the Treaty of Versailles. However, Bosch believed 
Germany could greatly prosper from forming economic ties with France and was confident 
Hitler would consider his plan. But the meeting did not go as hoped, and rather than Hitler 
listening to Bosch’s opinion he used the time to speak about the policies the regime would 
pursue. The Führer made an effort to speak about his economic agenda to almost every German 
industrialist upon obtaining power, giving businessmen the opportunity to participate and share 
the nation’s vision. But Bosch vehemently disagreed and attempted to keep the company distant 
from Nazis control. Bosch would meet Hitler personally on a few other occasions at automobile 
exhibitions and state receptions; however he never accepted invitations to political events.   
Bosch GmbH complied with the regime’s policies as minimally possible, which was a 
major reason for why they did not profit nearly as much as other companies. “If Bosch had 
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regarded the domestic political developments with the eyes of a businessman, he would have 
followed the example of a number of industrialists from the Rhineland and would have 
participated strongly in the financing of the National Socialism.”170 Hitler addressed the 
economic crisis by restoring Germany’s transport and motor sector. One of the party’s very first 
legislative initiatives was a stimulus package that benefited businesses that supplied parts for 
motor vehicles and motorcycles. As previously mentioned, the program would have a huge 
impact on the economy, stimulating economic activity and employing more than a million 
Germans. But the program also benefited the nation psychologically.  
The government’s willingness to invest capital into a sector that had struggled from the 
1920s to the early 30s helped restored business morale. Daimler-Benz, Auto-Union, and Opel 
were three German automotive companies that pledged to higher more full-time employees 
starting in April of 1933. The same was true for Bosch. The year 1933, which started with 8,332 
employees working an average of 45 hours a week at Bosch, ended with 11,235 employees and a 
48-hour week.171 That numbed reached 13,000 by April 1934.172 Nazis policies motivated 
companies to conduct business within the nation’s borders by offering tax incentives. Bosch, a 
company that had a number of foreign connections, began refocusing their business. In 1934 the 
company’s domestic sales increased by more than 80 percent.173 Even though German exports 
had declined significantly from 1933-1934, businesses were profiting like they had never before. 
Table VIII demonstrates the faith the NSDAP had in Germany’s transportation sector and the 
effect their policies had on the national economy.  
Table VIII. Vehicle Industry: business statistics, 1928-1935 
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Year Profit 
(No. of firms) 
Loss 
(No. of firms) 
Profit 
(RMm.) 
Loss 
(RMm.) 
Employment 
(Yearly Peak) 
1928 11 5 7.7 16.6 83,751 
1929 14 3 8.0 11.7 76,441 
1930 - 9 4.6 38.8 54,153 
1931 3 13 0.2 42.2 46,134 
1932 2 15 0.9 25.8 34,392 
1933 9 - 8.2 23.5 51,036 
1934 13 4 21.8 0.7 80,858 
1935 15 - 27.3 - 100,937 
Source: Richard James Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 79. 
 
The nation’s automotive sector suffered greatly from World War I and the Depression, causing 
car firms to request government subsidy in order to survive. Only 3 automotive firms reported 
profits in1929 and in 1930 the automotive firms only employed 50,000 citizens. Germany’s 
automotive companies were not successful and their car ownership numbers reflect that. 
Regardless, Hitler chose to invest federal capital into a depleted sector, believing that the 
nation’s economic recovery could be guided through the automobiles. The regime showed faith 
in the German nation when they invested capital and offered tax incentives for car firms, which 
resulted in a number of citizens and businesses buying into the regime’s plan. The tax deductions 
led to an overwhelmingly positive response from car firms, as the number of firms that reported 
earnings rose from 2 in 1932 to 15 in 1935. Bosch GmbH suffered immensely following World 
War I and the Depression, but the government’s confidence prompted the company to build a 
new facility for local sales and manufacturing purposes. Similar to Hitler’s motorization 
program, the new factory had a propagandistic effect as it promoted the national recovery and 
improvement of living conditions, exhibiting the restoration of the German work force. A weaker 
and more liberal decentralized government would have greater difficulty executing what the 
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Nazis were doing because there are so many varying interests and no clear national vision. 
Decentralized governments are unable to generate cohesive support and interest. The Nazi 
regime had concentrated power and authority, making it easier to invest all capital and resources 
into the nation’s automotive sector.  
 When the Autobahn project was announced in 1933, Bosch embarked on the creation of 
new innovative products. The new motor highway meant motorcars would be traveling at higher 
average speeds. 
This resulted in new elements of danger, especially during the hours of evening and night 
when visibility was decreasing or absent, and when cars were following each other at 
differing speeds and it became necessary to brake suddenly. The braking system was 
twice as long as the reach of the normal low beams.174  
In 1935 Bosch created long-distance headlights by bundling the high beams of the two front 
headlights together over 800 to 1,000 meters.175The product had a clever tilting mechanism that 
shifted the headlight from high to low beam when a car was approaching. In addition, the firm 
updated old antiqued steering wheels. The government’s investment in the transport sector fueled 
technological innovation, particularly at Bosch. The company was encouraged to create new 
original products because they received financial support from the federal government.  
Two Nazi government projects during 1930s that benefited Bosch was the creation of the 
German air force and the Volkswagen people’s car. Bosch had been working on ignition devices 
for airplanes for a long time. But German’s military air force was disbanded under the terms of 
the Treaty of Versailles. When Hitler consolidated power, the regime reformed the project with 
the creation of the Luftwaffe, Germany’s aerial warfare branch. Previously, the aircraft industry 
employed 3,200 people and had the capacity to produce no more than a hundred aircrafts per 
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year.176 But Hitler invested into the sector and the number of people employed by the aircraft 
industry sharply rose to 45,000 in October 1934 and to 135,000 by April 1936.177As the sector 
expanded further, firms such as Bosch began experiencing huge surges in production and 
employment levels because of their experiences in engine pumps and valves. “ITT-Lorenz, 
Bosch and the Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwekere (controlled by the Metallgesellschaft) were all 
major Luftwaffe suppliers.”178 In 1936 the assets of the air industry totaled more than 1 million 
Reichsmarks, with almost half from private sources.179 Germany’s aircraft industry was unique 
because the military aircrafts that were being produced had little or no value commercially, 
meaning that one of Germany’s largest new manufacturing sectors was not merely state 
controlled, but a product of state initiative, state funding and state direction. Political 
centralization enabled governments the power to create massive projects. Private businesses 
benefited from Nazi economic planning because they were encouraged to participate in the 
nation’s recovery. Without the NSDAP creating and sponsoring the Luftwaffe project, Bosch 
would never have reached such enormous production levels during the 1930s.  
Bosch also greatly benefited from the Volkswagen project. The regime had a difficult 
time lowering the cost of the vehicle; therefore they worked with Bosch to create unified 
electrical equipment.  
The greatest difficulty was caused by the necessity of keeping the products within a very 
limited range of costs; the models available for generators and starter motors, either 
combined or as separate units, were well tested but too expensive.180 
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Bosch’s task was to completely redesign the starter motor and generator to be the smallest 
possible size and weight at a capacity of 130 watts. While the firm worked on the project they 
also reached several production milestones. In August 1936 the five-millionth ignition device 
was manufactured; and in March, the five millionth headlight.  
Bosch greatly expanded from the Third Reich’s economic policies and incentives because 
they felt encouraged to produce new innovative products.  
The effect of the government-subsidized boom was most vividly expressed in the 
growing number of employees at Bosch in the period leading up to the Second World 
War. In 1933, there had been 11,235 workers and staff members at the Stuttgart and 
Feuerbach plants; in 1934, there were 14,980; in 1935, 16,117; in 1936, 18282; in 1938, 
23,2333.181 
 
Bosch GmbH clearly prospered under the Nazi motorization campaign because their labor force 
more than doubled from 1933 to 1938. The party’s investment into the motor sector motivated 
the firm to increase their production levels and take on new challenging projects where they 
eventually developed a monopoly over motorcar accessories.  
 In 1937 Bosch finally began to invest and show interest in the Nazi agenda and Four Year 
Plan. Within the framework of the Plan, German metal reserves were to be explored because the 
regime wanted the nation to be independent from the world market in all raw materials. Thus, 
Bosch bought the rights to various minefields from the German Montan GmbH in Wiesbaden, 
creating the metal mining company Westmark GmbH in Traben-Trarbach with a starting capital 
of 200,000 marks.182 The Nazi government regulated and monitored business activity to ensure it 
incorporated the regime’s vision; therefore Robert Bosch’s investment into metal mines was 
important because it displayed compliance. Bosch did not agree with the Nazis’ agenda; but 
invested into metals as a way of showing that the business was contributing towards the nation’s 
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vision. All German industrial businesses bought into the regime’s policies in varying degrees.  
IG Farben allocated 300 million Reichsmarks for their Luna synthetic fuel factory. Bosch, on the 
other hand, invested .0006% of that capital into their exploration for raw materials. The company 
could have received financial aid from the Nazi government similar to what other German 
companies did. But Bosch did not want the government’s support because the company did not 
agree with their policies. Bosch did not benefit from their investment in metals whatsoever, 
where their exploration in raw materials was actually counterproductive to their business. But the 
investment served as a façade and showed that Bosch was contributing in national goals. In 
reality, Bosch wanted to keep the company’s independence. The firm would have greatly 
prospered had they looked for financial aid from the Nazi government because they produced in 
a sector that Hitler believed was extremely important. But Bosch disagreed with Hitler’s policy 
and the company did not profit nearly as much as other industrial businesses.   
 Nazi demands started to grow as time went on and Bosch GmbH was forced to make 
further investments into the regime’s vision. “The factory itself had to reach some kind of 
accommodation with the new powers if it was not to be threatened with interference.”183 To 
relieve some of the pressure, a number of leading Bosch officials joined the party or became 
supporting members of the SS. Party membership was a protective and preventative measure 
against the danger of being overtaken by Nazi officials. But the regime’s pressure and authority 
did not stop there. In 1936 the party attempted to persuade Robert Bosch himself to join the 
NSDAP and donate money to the party. Bosch believed he had contributed more than enough 
financially to the German nation. Surviving records reveal that Bosch donated 100,000 marks to 
the Haus der Kunst, a museum in Munich and 50,000 marks to the Haus der Technik, a school in 
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Berlin.184 Thus Bosch was offended because he believed his donations to museums were at least 
tangible projects that benefited the entire nation. Official membership and party donations 
seemed unnecessary. Thus the requests went unanswered. On April 24, 1936 Robert Bosch 
wrote,  
But I cannot see my way clear to doing that, for my responsibilities, which are both moral 
and essential to my life, simply must take precedence over those of the Führer, which I do 
not even know; and at the same time the continuing existence of the firm is also of the 
greatest importance for Germany.185 
 
Bosch believed the attitude and existence of his company took priority over the regime’s goals 
and plan for Germany. When the government launched their rearmament campaign, the firm 
started to scale back. The expanding air force made Bosch’s workshops in Stuttgart and 
Feuerbach indispensable. The firm worried that they would become too deeply involved in the 
production of military goods and Bosch himself felt consequences would come with the 
accelerating weapons production.  
 Bosch was a pacifist that was against the idea of war and violence. Therefore in 
September of 1936, he and colleague visited Lieutenant General Werner von Blomberg, minister 
of the Nazi Army, to persuade him to cut down Germany’s military spending.  
The purpose of the visit was to use economic and political arguments to gain an ally 
against the one-sidedness and rapidity of the arms race, and to remind him of the danger 
and likely course of a war considering the political tensions and the international situation 
that governed the supplies of raw materials.186 
 
But von Blomberg refused to engage in any sort of discussion because it was his duty to execute 
the Führer’s orders. Following their failed meeting with von Blomberg, Bosch ordered that the 
firm be restructured. The firm began to withdraw from their partnerships with France and 
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England and sold most of their shares in foreign subsidiaries.187 In addition, Robert Bosch, who 
had served as the chairman of the supervisory board, became the sole business proprietor and 
authorized signatory for top management. He used this role to dissolve various sectors of the 
firm such as Eisemann Works, which produced haircutters, hand lanterns, and marine lighting.188 
He took all preventive measures to ensure that the firm would not be corrupted by the NSDAP.  
In 1937 Bosch made an important hire that correlated with the attitudes of the firm during 
the Nazi reign. The company employed Dr. Karl Goerdeler; a man who had previously been 
mayor of Leipzig but retired because he no longer wanted to expose himself to interference and 
attacks by the NSDAP. During his time as mayor, Goerdeler opposed many Nazi principles and 
attempted to help Jewish businessmen that were threatened with the “Aryanization” economic 
policies.189 Despite his early support for the party and pressure from the National Socialists, 
Goerdeler always refused to become a member.190 Following his resignation as mayor, Bosch 
appointed Goerdeler as director of the overseas sales department. However, Goerdeler would 
have no real responsibilities at the firm and instead the position was used as a façade that 
allowed him to carry out anti-Nazi plots. Robert Bosch and Goerdeler were friends that had 
similar views on foreign policy and Germany’s relation to the world market. When the firm 
employed Goerdeler, him and Bosch formed a resistance group called the Stuttgart Circle, 
comprising of Goerdeler, Bosch, the managing director Hans Walz, Bosch’s private secretary 
Willy Schloobstein, and other members of the board of management.191 The group’s 
responsibilities included attracting like-minded people, helping the persecuted, forming relations 
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with the German Resistance, and establishing contacts with the outside world.192 The chief 
connection between the Stuttgart Circle and the Resistance was Goerdeler, who would use his 
position as a cover and received financial backing for his opposition activities.  
Between 1937 and 1939 Goerdeler used his cover and traveled abroad to warn countries 
about Nazi Germany’s aggressive and dangerous foreign policies.  
Starting in June 1937, Goerdeler’s grand tour took him to Belgium and Britain, and after 
a brief return to Berlin, to Holland, to France and thence in August to Canada and the 
United States and back to France. A second trip in March and April 1938 led again to 
France and Britain, and a third one, beginning in August 1938, to Switzerland and via 
Italy to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. A fourth trip, in March and April 1939, took 
him to France and Algeria, and finally a fifth one, in the spring and summer of 1939, to 
Britain, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, and Switzerland.193 
 
Through a loose contractual agreement and a phony position, Bosch secretly funded Goerdeler’s 
trips abroad, allowing him to share the German government’s persecution of Jews to other 
countries and churches.  Besides influencing foreign governments, Goerdeler also attempted to 
motivate the German army into considering an anti-Nazi putsch, or coup. Thus instead of buying 
into the Nazi vision, Bosch took the moral high road where he made it appear that the company 
participated in the economic agenda, where in reality it downsized and funded an underground 
resistance movement.  
After Germany invaded Austria and prepared to enter Poland, Bosch and other 
businessmen knew that soon every industrial firm would have to make further contributions 
towards the war effort. In a letter to his daughter Margarete in 1939, Bosch wrote, “I am happy 
that the war is here. This is the only way we will get rid of the criminals.”194 Little evidence 
exists about Bosch’s personal position or his judgment about the various phases of the war. “Like 
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his friends, he had learned to be silent.”195 Many Germans buried their feelings inside themselves 
because there were few other options. As the fighting progressed, Bosch’s facilities at Stuttgart 
and Feuerbach were forced to produce tanks and air fleets and had become a central component 
of the nations armaments. In addition, the National Socialists began applying force to workshops, 
which was something disturbing to Bosch because historically he had treated employees well. In 
his factory regulations of 1934, Bosch had specifically failed to include any fines to be levied 
against workers or staff members.196  
Totalitarian regulation and its demands forced their way into the factory with its unique 
historical character, and the Bosch firm had to be satisfied to await the day when it would 
once more be free of such compulsions and could return to its old mission in its technical, 
business, and sociopolitical plans and decisions.197 
 
Nazi coercion pressured Bosch GmbH to engage in activities that it would not normally do. A 
major drawback of centralized politics is that it restricted business decision-making and 
freedoms, forcing them to share the Nazis’ vision. While Nazi economics caused Bosch GmbH 
to grow and profit, their policies also hurt the company’s independence. Bosch felt threatened by 
the NSDAP and it caused them to invest into sectors they normally would not. Eventually, the 
threats turned into action and the Nazis overtook their facilities. The Third Reich was too strong 
and powerful. The factories in Stuttgart and Feuerbach were forced to install more strict and 
oppressive labor laws and produce military goods. Bosch knew personally there nothing he 
could; which is why he let the Nazi centralized government run its course until it failed. 
However their power allowed them to take over control of the firm’s production, causing them to 
be targeted by Allied Bombers. In 1944 both Bosch’s factories were destroyed.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Hitler and the National Socialists’ highly regulated and centralized policies were 
beneficial for Germany’s economy because they promoted industrial innovation, restored 
business confidence, and fueled economic growth. However the moral and ethical beliefs 
attached to these policies caused the system to rightfully fail. The advantage of a centralized 
government is that it concentrates power, authority, and decision-making responsibilities into an 
individual or small number of actors. The system is effective and efficient because it creates a 
focused and unified vision where all actors operate in the same direction; therefore preventing 
potential inconsistencies.  
The model has been used for centuries and in 221 BC it helped China to achieve immense 
success, attain world dominance, and move far ahead of Europe and the Middle East in a number 
of technological fields. Previously, China had been separated into a number of distinct and 
separate kingdoms that were governed by various rulers. However during the late 3rd century BC, 
Qin Shi Huang conducted a series of military campaigns and conquered six Chinese kingdoms, 
becoming the first ever emperor of China. He abolished the nation’s old feudal system and 
unified the various kingdoms by standardizing language, writing, measurements, and currency.198 
He ordered for the construction of a vast network of roads and canals that would connect areas, 
improve trade, and unify citizens. By standardizing the culture and connecting various regions, 
the nation became stronger because it was larger geographically and had greater trading 
opportunities. Qin Shi Huang used strong restrictive political policies to unify separate territories 
and create one large nation. To disperse some of the authroity, Huang placed close associates in 
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powerful bureaucratic positions so the government could better monitor economic activity. 
However, all Chinese states abided by federal rule. Shi Haung issued a number of gigantic public 
works projects, including the Great Wall of China and the Terracotta Army, to unify the nation 
and build national morale.199 Projects of that magnitude were only possible under the jurisdiction 
of a strong compacted government, like emperor Shi Haung, because the government had the 
power to organize funds and plan construction.  
 Hitler and the NSDAP’s political agenda were very similar to the model used during the 
Qin dynasty. During the Weimar years, unrestricted commerce caused private enterprise to 
dominate and rule the nation. The government interfered little with market and trade, instead 
allowing businesses to fuel economic growth. The system worked for Germany, where by 1929 
Germany was producing 33% more than it did during 1913.200 But laissez-faire economics and 
decentralization motivated firms to become heavily involved and integrated in the world market. 
For instance, IG Farben and Bosch conducted most of their business with foreign nations, where 
80% and 88% of their sales were generated abroad, respectively.201 Liberal and unrestrictive 
financial systems motivate firms to operate aboard because it maximizes their individual utility, 
as opposed to the nations. In other words, companies are predominantly concerned with their 
particular assets and wealth as opposed to the general welfare of the nation. Thus, Germany 
developed a very weak economic structure because private businesses were exchanging most of 
their capital abroad. When the American banks crashed, a severe shock wave was sent through 
all of Germany resulting in every citizen to suffer. Millions were left without work, capital was 
completely drained from the economy, which was all created due to business selfishness and 
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unrestricted capitalism. Hitler and the NSDAP used this opportunity to rise to power because 
they promoted a new anti-liberal and centralized plan for the nation.  
 Centralization and the political policies implemented by the regime greatly benefited 
Germany for a number of reasons.  They helped stimulate the economy, restore a depleted motor 
sector, fuel industrial innovation and business growth, and enhance the entire German collective. 
In the final years of the Weimar Republic, Germany’s market was idle with little capital 
circulating through the economy. By the end of 1931, over 6.5 billion marks had been withdrawn 
from the nation and over 6 million people were unemployed.202 In order to stimulate economic 
growth the NSDAP began creating state sponsored work projects and offering tax incentives to 
private companies that worked in the motor sector. The country needed guidance following the 
Depression, therefore the Nazi government used their power to create a number of giant public 
works projects to encourage business development and put citizens back to work. One of the 
largest projects issued by the regime was the road-building program and the construction of the 
Autobahn, which Hitler hoped would provide the nation with a source of national pride, as well 
as supplying jobs for those who had been unemployed during the Great Depression. The 
expansion and improvement of Germany’s road had a profound effect on the economy, and it 
helped create more than 1 million jobs and pave over 6,500 miles.203 Hitler stimulated the 
economy and unified the nation in a similar manner to what Qin Shi Huang did with China when 
he became emperor. The roads unified various regions in Germany and boosted national morale, 
while at the same creating a number of job opportunities for citizens who desperately needed 
work. A decentralized government could not have restored Germany’s economy the same way 
the NSDAP did. Political decentralization causes businesses to worry about their own well-being 
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and financial status. IG Farben and Bosch GmbH were heavily integrated in the world market in 
the early 1920s because it was profitable to have trade relations with as many nations possible. 
They flourished during the Weimar Republic because they had the freedom to engage in business 
transactions that benefited the firm. However when the Depression hit Germany, they were more 
concerned with the financial status of their company compared to the nation. No private business 
was going to guide Germany out of its economic mess and employ German citizens who needed 
work. The nation needed the guidance of a strong and powerful government like Hitler and the 
Nazi regime. The party provided the nation with a plan and concentrated all their attention and 
resources in ways that helped the nation. Therefore Nazi centralized economic planning was 
beneficial Germany at the time because the nation needed their power to rebuild. The nation 
needed a strong centralized government to outlay funds for public works projects that would help 
alleviate the unemployment crisis. The regime generated a great deal of political support because 
their public works campaigns gave citizens a purpose. Middle-class morale was low following 
the Depression and many felt disconnected from the nation. When Hitler helped employ over 6 
million people, he gained their loyalty because they felt apart of the nation, or 
Volksgemeinschaft.  
 In addition to the public works campaigns, the National Socialists’ policies were good for 
German businesses because they encouraged economic growth by granting tax reductions to 
businesses that invested into the motor sector.  The concessions obviously had a profound impact 
on firms that predominantly dealt with the manufacture of automotive equipment. For instance, 
sales for German motorcar firms more than doubled from 1933 to 1934 and the number of motor 
companies that reported earnings increased from two in 1932 to 15 in 1935.204 Bosch GmbH was 
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one company that profited immensely from the Nazis’ tax reductions, as their labor force more 
than doubled from 11,235 in 1933 to 23,2333 in 1938.205 Furthermore, in 1934 the firm saw their 
domestic sales increase by more than 80 percent.206 The concessions offered by the regime were 
profitable for the nation because they motivated firms to rebuild and invest. Bosch GmbH and 
other businesses had suffered immensely following the Depression. Therefore the NSDAP’s 
response to the crisis and the creation of their stimulus package was important because it 
promoted German businesses to expand and also caused firms to grow an affection for the 
regime’s policies and rule.  
The tax concessions also benefited businesses that initially had no interest in the motor 
sector because it motivated them to rebuild and invest through that specific sector. For example, 
in the 1920s IG Farben predominantly produced synthetic dyes and pharmaceuticals. However in 
1932, the firm decided to begin a synthetic oil project that would explore fuel alternatives. Even 
though the project initially failed when the world price for oil collapsed, it received aid from the 
government for a number of reasons. First, because the project helped Germany’s motor sector, 
the Nazi regime took away some of the risk involved in the investment and helped IG expand its 
facilities to a capacity of 35,000 tons per annum.207 In addition, the regime showed that it was 
willing to support businesses that showed initiative and were willing to invest in such an unstable 
economy. Private companies can be reserved during unfortunate economic times. However, IG 
Farben demonstrated that they willing to grow and expand in a dismal economy when it invested 
into synthetic technology. The Nazi regime showed that they were looking out for the well-being 
of the nation when they supported IG’s faulty investment. Farben showed courage when the 
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company invested 300 million Reichsmarks into an unfamiliar project during a fragile world 
economy. By taking away some of the investment’s risk, the Nazis helped restore business 
confidence and promoted economic growth. Enough cannot be said about the National 
Socialists’ policies and the way they helped German businesses recover from dismal conditions. 
When Hitler came to power, over 6.04 million people were unemployed. Twelve months later 
the number dropped to 3.7 million.208 Private enterprise was not going to guide the nation out of 
its economic misery. The nation needed a strong, centralized government to show the nation the 
path to recovery, which is what the Nazi regime did with public works projects and tax 
concessions. 
 The Nazi central government and their political policies also benefited Germany because 
they repaired a very undersized and insignificant motor sector. In the early 1930s, Germany’s car 
ownership was dwarfed by other world powers like the United States, France, and the UK. For 
example, in 1933 there was only one car for every 37 households.209At the time, motorcycles had 
a very stronger presence in German society because they were both cheaper and more affordable. 
This showed that Germany was not a particularly affluent society because most citizens were not 
capable of affording the more expensive and luxurious motorcar. In addition to poor car 
ownership, only 25% of German main roads had hardened surfaces that could withstand high 
volume motor traffic.210 Hitler’s consolidation of power was important because it helped restore 
the nation’s motor sector and lead Germany into becoming one of the largest auto manufacturers 
in the entire world. Hitler was a motor enthusiast who believed every citizen should have the 
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means to own a car. The government issued policies and plans to expand the sector and 
consequently raise the standard of living of the entire nation.  
The Nazis concentrated most of their attention in restoring the nations automotive sector. 
Between 1932 and 1935 60% of the funds released by the government for public works projects 
went to the motor sector. The road-building program and Autobahn would rebuild the nation’s 
roads and better equip Germany for mass transportation, which Hitler believed would become 
possible by the Volkswagen project. Hitler was enraged that Germany had become an 
impoverished nation that relied on motorcycles as a form of transit. Volkswagen would create an 
affordable car that every citizen had the means to purchase. The regime used their authority to 
sponsor the entire project and create a car that would cost only 1,000 Reichsmarks. The Nazi 
government was extremely advantageous for Germany because it restored a motor sector that 
was depleted and exhausted. The regime’s power enhanced the automotive sector and aimed to 
increase that nation’s standard of living. Nazi centralized economic planning was advantageous 
for Germany because the government had the power and ability to plan, organize, and allocate 
the necessary funds needed to make the project possible. The regime wanted to create a stronger, 
more united, and affluent nation through the Volkswagen project and road-building program.  
The Nazi government effectively restored and elevated the nation’s motor sector by 
sponsoring and endorsing motorization projects. By 1938, the motor industry had become 
Germany’s largest manufacturing employer and car production and ownership were higher than 
what they had been in the last five years. However the Nazis’ vision did not stop there, as they 
hoped Germany would become the most dominant manufacturer of automotive parts and 
vehicles in the world. When the party announced the construction of the Volkswagen factory, 
they aimed for factory to be the largest that had ever existed with an ability to produce more than 
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3 million cars per annum. The Nazis’ economic and political policies were advantageous for 
Germany, as they put the nation on track to reach levels they had never reached before. Without 
their strong authoritative power, Germany would not be where it is today in terms of car sales. A 
survey Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles (OICA) indicates Germany 
produced more motorcars in 2010 than any other country in Europe with 5,905,985.211 It ranks 
4th in car production levels where it only lies behind China, the United States, and Japan.212 In 
the 1920s, Germany possessed one of the worst automotive industries in the EU. While no 
Volkswagen cars were sold during Hitler’s reign, the regime created the structure that helped the 
nation later prosper. The nation’s motor sector was so atrocious that it needed the aid of a 
totalitarian centralized government like the National Socialists. The regime revitalized the 
automotive sector with the Volkswagen project, road-building program, and tax incentives. Each 
Nazi project would help make Germany a more affluent society. The Autobahn, for instance, was 
a revolutionary achievement that would forever change the way humans’ travel. Similarly, the 
Volkswagen would set a new standard for automotive production. Hitler had high aspirations for 
the nation, which was beneficial because the lofty standards made German’s work extremely 
hard. German industry benefited from the radical and powerful rule of the regime because it 
created the structure that Germany flourishes under today. Hence, the party’s totalitarian policies 
and immense power were good for Germany as they helped turn a historically poor automotive 
sector into one of the strongest in the world by the 21st century. 
The NSDAP was also advantageous for Germany at the time because their power 
motivated and pressured private technological companies to be innovative and original. In some 
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cases, capitalism causes businesses to be passive and conservative because risks are always 
associated with investments. Therefore even though the NSDAP resorted to force and coercion, 
Germany benefited from the Nazi rule because their financial assistance motivated businesses to 
create new products. For instance, no car firms in Germany believed creating a car costing only 
1,000 RM was possible. At the time, the going rate for a vehicle was between 1,500-2,000RM. 
The stubbornness and doggedness of Hitler would pay off as it motivated Ferdinand Porsche and 
other Volkswagen engineers to create a design that would make the project feasible. The 
company struggled and tested for many years trying to find the correct design.  
More than a dozen men worked together in Porsche’s small garage, laboring day after 
day on the first three Volkswagen cars. They changed the engine type numerous times, 
going from a two-cylinder, two-cycle, water-cooled engine to an air-cooled, four-cycle, 
two-cylinder engine. The first did poorly when tested over long distances; the latter didn’t 
have adequate power in the lower ranges. They tried all sorts of bodies: The three early 
cars were made of different materials—one wood, one a thin metal, and finally one that 
was all steel.213 
 
The pressure Hitler exerted on the engineers at Volkswagen prompted them to discover a model 
that would work. Volkswagen laborers worked day in and day out to find a design that would run 
efficiently and cost less than 1,000 RM. Without the fear that Hitler instilled in citizen, the 
company may not have designed the Volkswagen. The employees were motivated to find the 
correct design because they knew the blame was entirely on them if they failed. At a Berlin Auto 
Show, Hitler once said, “Gentlemen! There can only be one Volkswagen, not ten!”214 
Volkswagen employees knew the nation and Hitler depended on them to find a suitable design. 
That fear certainly played a role in the creation of the Volkswagen.  
 Centralized Nazi economics also benefited Germany because it caused many private 
businesses to greatly grow and expand. Hitler’s policies had a profound impact on almost all 
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German industrial firms, as many experienced a huge surge in production and employment. For 
instance, Bosch GmbH saw the company’s net income increase from 832,000 marks in 1932 to 1 
million 1933. Eventually, they would surpass 3.5 million marks.215 IG Farben also profited and 
expanded under where in 1942 they opened twelve new hydrogenation plants with a capacity of 
3.85 million tons per year, seeing their profits total 351 million RM.216 Nazis policies stimulated 
growth and motivated firms to expand, which is why Bosch GmbH and IG Farben experienced 
such a huge surge in revenues and employment.  
 Lastly, Germany benefited from the jurisdiction of Hitler and the National Socialists 
because the policies were aimed at benefiting all citizens.The regime opposed capitalism and a 
free market because they felt it led to greed and oppression. Therefore the party’s policies were 
geared towards benefiting the entire German collective and raising the standard of living of all. 
Following World War I and the Depression, German society was suffering. The nation was poor, 
unstable, and they were financially 25-30 years behind the United States. In addition, typical 
Americans owned standardized goods that the German public did not. As a way to raise the 
standard of living of the nation, the government collaborated with industries to create a 
standardized version of key consumer commodities. The products would be created at the lowest 
possible price and enable the middle class to have the ability to buy them. The Nazi government 
aimed to strengthen and unify the nation by creating a people’s car, radio, apartment, 
refrigerator, and other basic goods. The products would destroy class division and put the 
collective good of the nation ahead of individual greed. Formerly, Germany’s working class was 
marginalized by the growth of industry and private enterprises. The regime’s policies appealed to 
majority of the nation because they put the interests of the community ahead of the egotistical 
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interests of capitalists. Hitler’s strategy was to have the entire nation benefit from the projects, 
not just a specific class. In the end, a people’s community or Volksgemeinschaft would emerge in 
which there would no longer be elitism or class divides. Therefore, the regime was beneficial to 
Germany because their policies were predominantly socialist and geared towards erasing class 
divisions and unifying the public.  
However, while economically Germany prospered under Hitler’s leadership, the moral 
principles attached to his policies caused the Nazi regime to deservedly fail. A problem with a 
powerful centralized government is it restricts and hampers both business and individual 
freedoms. During the Weimar years, German companies experienced very lax regulations and 
enforcement from the federal government. The liberal economic model allowed private 
enterprises to engage with international markets under their won discretion and engage in trades 
that they believed were smart and beneficial. The liberties these businesses enjoyed during those 
years were abandoned completely under the Nazi regime. Instead of making financial decisions 
based on what was best for their company, German businesses were forced to abide by the 
NSDAP’s principles and ideology.  They lost all freedoms, liberties and decision-making and 
became economic functionaries that were forced to act in the best interest of the nation. For 
instance, the Nazi government believed the nation to become independent in the production of 
natural resources. Therefore they used their power and authority to bully companies into 
investing into the project. One way the government forced companies to comply was by drafting 
legal documents. For example, when German coal and mineral oil businesses declined to donate 
money to Germany’s exploration in raw materials, the government drafted a decree that 
threatened company employees with either huge fines or imprisonment.217 In addition, Robert 
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Bosch wanted nothing to do with the Nazi regime and their principles, which is why he kept his 
company and the party as distant as possible. However the NSDAP was too powerful and 
totalitarian regulations found their way into the factory and coerced the factory into producing 
weaponry. In essence, the party destroyed business sovereignty where they had lost all decision-
making responsibilities.  
Besides restricting business freedom, the Nazi government interfered with personal 
liberties of citizens. The regime also drafted legal decrees that hindered citizen’s freedom of 
expression by censoring the press and radio.  
The Reichstag Fire Decree suspended the provisions of the German constitution that 
protected basic individual rights, including freedom of press, freedom of speech, and 
freedom of assembly. The decree also permitted increased state and police intervention 
into private life, allowing officials to censor mail, listen in on phone conversations, and 
search private homes without a warrant or need to show reasonable case. Under the state 
of emergency established by the decree, the Nazi regime could arrest and detain people 
without cause and without limits on the length of incarceration.218 
 
The Nazi government’s power was so great that it altered German society and destroyed basic 
liberties that citizens were accustomed to. They forced the nation to share their vision, which 
meant restricting citizen’s expression of ideas. In addition to censorship, the regime believed 
citizens should make sacrifices for the greater good of the nation. When the NSDAP and DAF 
planned the construction of the Volkswagen factory, they forced landowners to forfeit their 
property. Nazi politics was harmful because it allowed for no disagreement or variance. Every 
citizen had to agree with the plan or they faced imprisonment and fines; There was no middle 
ground. To ensure the party encountered no political resistance, the SA and Gestapo went from 
                                                
218 "Nazi Terror Begins," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, last modified May 11, 
2012, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005686.  
 93 
door to door looking for party enemies, arresting Socialists, Communists, trade union leaders, 
and others who had spoken out against the party.219  
Other than restricting the entire nation’s civil liberties, a drawback of Nazi rule was 
because it accepted the use of forced labor.  While Nazi economic policies undoubtedly 
benefited Germany and caused a number of industrial firms to expand, they were also awful 
because the party used forced labor to fill the void. One study estimated that of the 13.5 million 
foreigners who worked in Germany from 1939 to 1945, at least 12 million were forced to do 
so.220 The nation developed a labor shortage because the economy had expanded too fast and 
become too large. The NSDAP explored forced labor as a solution and coerced millions of Jews 
and other Eastern Europeans to work in German factories. Almost all German industrial firms 
resorted to forced labor, and many of them were coerced to do so. For instance, Volkswagen was 
a company that had never been fully staffed because the factory was being constructed. 
Therefore the firm needed to resort to forced labor if it expected to reach its lofty production 
goals, which is why in the middle of the war 80% of their staff were forced workers.221 In 
addition to Volkswagen, IG Farben was another company that used forced labor, participating in 
a cycle with Auschwitz that worked people until they were walking corpses and then sent them 
back to be fully exterminated.   
Most workers in Germany were subjected to awful working conditions, mistreatment, and 
malnutrition. One report in November of 1943 by the Economic Staff East that inspected various 
camps had the following to say:  
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Even the most necessary things, such as food and housing, often leave much to be 
desired. They are inadequate, haphazardly prepared, and filthy—indeed, in some cases, 
bad beyond all measures… [We] will never forget the wretchedness and misery in 
Bochumer Verein camp: workers terribly run-down, their morale catastrophic, camp 
neglected and filthy. Food insufficient. Flogging. Families torn apart.222 
 
For the most part, all factories and camps resembled the conditions mentioned in the report. 
However one first hand account of the setting can be seen from what Feliksa W. wrote in 1999, 
“I was 15 years old at the time, we lived in disgusting barracks, fenced in with barbed wire, we 
were hungry and it was freezing. We were treated like slaves.”223 Even though the Nazis’ 
policies greatly benefited Germany’s economy and helped facilitate growth, they engaged in 
awful activities such as their use of forced labor.  
 Nazi centralized politics was also harmful for Germany because the regime created the 
most destructive war in history. Hitler had always planned for Germany to engage in war 
because he drafted the Four Year Plan and always spoke of an expansion of Lebensraum. Hitler 
wanted Germany to grow, believing more living space would increase the nations standard of 
living. In 1939 the nation invaded Austria and Poland, causing the grueling six-year war to 
being.  In terms of losses in human lives and material sources, World War II is undeniably the 
most destructive military conflict to date. More than sixty countries were involved in the fighting 
and over 60 million people were killed, which was over 2.5% of the world population.224 In 
addition to the high levels of death, Europe’s economy had completely collapsed where 70% of 
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the industrial infrastructure had been destroyed.225 Hitler’s moral beliefs caused most of Europe 
to lay in runs in 1945. Combat and bombings had flattened cities and town, destroyed bridges 
and railways, and left little infrastructure standing.  
 Lastly and most importantly, the major drawback of Nazi centralization was their anti-
Semitic attitudes and persecution of Jews. The regime carried out their first public act of hatred 
against Jews on April 1, 1933 when they planned a boycott targeting Jewish businesses and 
professionals.226 On the day of the boycott, Nazi officials stood outside the front of Jewish-
owned department stores and held posters saying "Don't Buy from Jews!" (Kauf nicht bei 
Juden!), "The Jews Are Our Misfortune!" (Die Juden sind unser Unglück!) and "Go to 
Palestine!" (Geh nach Palästina!).227The national boycott marked the beginning of a nationwide 
campaign by the Nazi party against the entire German Jewish population. A week later on April 
7, the Nazi government passed the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, 
which restricted employment in the civil service exclusively to “Aryans.”228The law prevented 
Jews from serving as teachers, professors, judges, or other government positions. However, these 
oppressive acts would be nothing compared to the Final Solution. The massacre of about one 
million Jews occurred before the plans of the Final Solution had been implemented in 1942.229 
But the Final Solution was the next phase of the Holocaust in which Hitler and the Nazi regime 
aimed to eradicate the entire Jewish population. To increase the pace in which Jews were killed, 
the NSDAP began to construct extermination camps. The regime transported Jews to the death 
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camps and they either died from firing squad, poor living conditions, or gas chambers. By the 
end of the war in 1945, the NSDAP had murder approximately 6 million Jews.230 As a result, 
Hitler and Nazi regime will forever live in history for their horrible and disgusting actions.   
   The National Socialists’ unprecedented power and coercive rule benefited Germany in 
the beginning because their economic policies created immense success. As mentioned, the Great 
Depression impacted heavily on the nation’s economy because a significant part economy was 
supported by foreign loans. When American banks collapsed, all capital supporting German 
businesses and banks was recalled, which resulted in a cash liquidity crisis. Millions of citizens 
were unemployed and the nation had lost hope in the nation’s free market system. Hitler and the 
Nazi regime brought forth a quick fix solution that pledged to resolve the employment crisis and 
stimulate the economy through the guidance of a strong centralized government. The National 
Socialists’ system resulted great success and the regime was credited with achieving the 
‘economic miracle.’ They fixed the issue of employment and gave citizens a strong sense of 
national pride by issuing giant works projects, such as the Autobahn. In addition, they helped 
restore business confidence and stimulate growth by offering tax incentives for firms that 
invested into Germany’s motor sector. The regime undoubtedly accumulated a great deal of 
national support. They provided German citizens with a sense of purpose, promising to create a 
Volksgemeinschaft. However, even though the regime’s totalitarian policies led to huge 
economic growths and the creation of new innovative products, they will be remembered for 
their disregard of German civil liberties and atrocious crimes against Jews and other Eastern 
Europeans. 
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 So many businesses and citizens contributed to Hitler’s rise to power, assigning difficulty 
is extremely difficult. The entire regime cannot be fully penalized because many were 
conscripted to become members, such as is the case with Bosch and IG Farben. In addition, firms 
like IG Farben, Bosch GmbH, and Volkswagen were forced to make contributions to the Nazi 
war effort. From the beginning, Robert Bosch opposed the party’s principles and was a political 
advocate for Gewerbefreiheit, or business freedom. He tried all he could to resists becoming 
intertwined with the party. He refused to donate to the regime directly; he downsized his 
company, declined party membership, and even funded an underground resistance movement. 
But his actions were not enough, and the company was forced to partake in the creation of 
wartime materials, causing their facilities to be bombed by Allied Nations. Similarly, IG Farben 
initially opposed Hitler’s rise to power because supported laissez-faire economics. The company 
felt compelled to form relations with the regime after their poor investment. But the firm tossed 
all moral beliefs aside and looked at their situation entirely from a business perspective, causing 
their company history to be tainted for their involvement in Nazi war crimes. And lastly, 
Ferdinand Porsche was an engineer who was given the opportunity of a lifetime when Hitler 
approached him about the Volkswagen project. The company’s facilities held off Nazi pressure, 
however as the war progressed their efforts proved futile. IG Farben, Bosch, and Volkswagen all 
eventually employed forced laborers because the livelihoods of their companies depended on it. 
One business cannot be assigned blame for Hitler’s rise to power. The nation had been dragged 
to hell in back following the Great Depression. The German public supported the party because 
Hitler promised to strengthen the nation; and he did when he helped employ more than 3 million 
citizens in his first year. Hitler gave the nation a feeling of important and self-worth, including 
businesses. He showed he was willing to support Germany’s recovery and create a united 
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people’s community. Therefore, assigning responsibility of the events that transpired in Nazi 
Germany to one particular act is difficult because all citizens and businesses helped Hitler in one 
form or another. Nazi centralized economic planning undoubtedly helped restore Germany’s 
economy. But the system deservedly failed because the Third Reich accumulated too much 
power and authority, resulting in some of the most grotesque acts in world history.  
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